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MICHIGAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT
I. POLITICAL BACKGROUND
The Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 19701 was
signed by the Governor on July 27, 1970, after more than a year
of intensive lobbying by citizen groups and environmentalist or-
ganizations on the one hand, and by a few individual industries
and the Michigan Chamber of Commerce on the other. Its prima-
ry purpose is to facilitate, through the medium of legislation, the
creation of an environmental common law by the Michigan
courts.
The Act permits the "attorney general, any political subdivision
of the state, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a
political subdivision thereof' as well as any "legal entity" to
maintain an action in an appropriate circuit court for declaratory
and equitable relief against the state, its agencies and subdivi-
sions, or any other' "legal entity" for the "protection of the air,
water and other natural resources and the public trust therein
from pollution, impairment or destruction."'2 Once the plaintiff has
made a prima facie showing that the defendant has, or is likely to
pollute or otherwise damage any of the state's natural resources,
the defendant may either rebut the plaintiff's evidence 3 or estab-
lish by way of an affirmative defense, that "there is no feasible
and prudent alternative" to his conduct, and that such conduct is
"consistent with the promotion of the public health, safety and
welfare in light of the state's paramount concern for the protection
of its natural resources from pollution, impairment or destruc-
tion." 4
The Act permits a circuit court to grant temporary and per-
manent equitable relief or to impose conditions on a defendant
necessary to protect the natural resources of the state.5 Alterna-
tively, the circuit court may remit the parties to administrative,
licensing or other proceedings or promulgate a standard of con-
1 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1971). This Act, in its original
form, was drafted by Joseph L. Sax, Professor of Law, University of Michigan, for the
West Michigan Environmental Action Council. The discussion in this grouping of notes
will refer to the Act as H.B. 3055, which was the popular name ascribed to the proposal by
its supporters and the press prior to passage.2  d. § 691.1202(I).
3Id. § 691.1203(1).
4 Id.
5 Id. § 691.1204().
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duct where the court, after determining the "validity, applicability
and reasonableness" of an agency standard, finds it deficient.6 If
the court chooses not to immediately adjudicate an action, it is
required to retain jurisdiction pending completion of the pro-
ceedings to which the action was referred for the purpose of
determining whether adequate protection from pollution has
been afforded. 7 In addition, the Act authorizes intervention by a
"legal entity" in any administrative proceeding whose subject
matter has environmental implications, and judicial review of the
agency decision upon the assertion that the administrative pro-
ceeding "involves conduct which has, or which is likely to have,
the effect of polluting, impairing or destroying the air, water or
other natural resources or the public trust therein." 8
In order to safeguard defendants from frivolous and spurious
claims, the court, if it has reasonable ground to doubt the
plaintiff's solvency or his ability to pay the costs of a possible
adverse judgment, may require a plaintiff to post a surety bond
or cash of up to five hundred dollars.9 Moreover, the court is
empowered to apportion costs1 ° and apply the doctrines of col-
lateral estoppel and res judicata.1'
A 1967 suit by the Environmental Defense Fund against the
Michigan Agriculture Department' 2 was indirectly responsible for
the effort to enact a law allowing individual suits as a means of
safeguarding the environment. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully
sought a writ of mandamus to prevent the Agriculture Depart-
6 Id. § 691.1 202(2)(a)(6).
7Id. § 691.1204(4).
8 id. § 691.1205(l).
9 Id. § 691.1202a.
10 Id. § 691.1203(3).
11 id. § 691.1205(3).
12 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Director of Agriculture Dep't, I I Mich. App.
693 (1967). The Environmental Defense Fund, Incorporated (EDF), a non-profit New
York membership corporation, is an alliance of lawyers and scientists dedicated to the
protection of man's environment. The EDF brought this suit in late 1967. The Michigan
Court of Appeals found that the Michigan State Department of Agriculture had not
exceeded its discretion and hence a temporary restraining order was dissolved and the
spraying of 4600 acres of small watersheds draining into Lake Michigan was carried out as
planned.
This case, however, brought to the surface the growing conflict between the Michigan
Department of Agriculture and the Michigan Department of Natural Resources. The
Department of Natural Resources, opposed to the use of persistent pesticides, had joined
the case on the side of the plaintiffs. The agency conflict was eventually resolved by a
three-man panel, appointed by the Governor, which ruled that if allowed to go untreated
the Japanese beetles would eventually require even heavier chemical treatment. The
subsequent crop-dusting spread two pounds per acre of dieldrin over three thousand acres,
and ten pounds of chlordane per acre over another sixteen thousand acres. The original
plan had called for spraying twenty-eight thousand acres. Persistent Pesticides and Envi-
ronmental Quality, 6 COLUM. J. L. & SOC'L. PROB. 122, 124, 140 (1970). See also George
Laycock, The Beginning of the End for DDT, 115 CONG. REC. 21,994-997 (1969).
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ment from spraying the pesticide Dieldrin on certain farm areas to
eradicate the Japanese beetle. Frustrated by what they considered
to be a problem of national scope confronting environmental
law-the judiciary's unwarranted confidence in the determinations
of administrative regulatory agencies which too often tended to
identify with the interests of those groups ostensibly being regu-
lated -local supporters of the pesticide suit began searching for a
means by which persons interested in protecting the environment
could gain more adequate responses from the legal system.
In early 1969 the West Michigan Environmental Action Coun-
cil (W.M.E.A.C.), whose members had participated in the 1967
case against the Agriculture Department, sent a letter to Profes-
sor Joseph L. Sax of the University of Michigan Law School
requesting him to propose legislative reforms which would facil-
itate the bringing of actions to protect the environment. Sensitive
to the apparent inability of environmentalists to obtain adequate
relief from administrative agencies, and the deference with which
courts have traditionally reviewed administrative determinations,
Professor Sax drafted a bill which hopefully would create "a more
responsive and sensitive forum in which to continue the...
struggle for a better environment.' 13 In essence, the bill would
allow a citizen to bring his complaint against activities harmful to
the environment directly before the courts without first seeking
relief from an administrative agency.
Once drafted, the bill's supporters turned their attention to the
problem of obtaining favorable legislative action. To offset the
strong opposition expected from government agencies and in-
dustry, the proponents sought to mobilize public support with an
extensive campaign encompassing a broad spectrum of environ-
mental concerns. In the early stages, leadership and organization
came from the membership of the W.M.E.A.C. This group was
soon joined by other influential organizations such as the Mack-
inac (Michigan) Chapter of the Sierra Club, the Parent-Teachers
Association, the League of Women Voters and the United Auto
Workers. 14 Seeking to minimize duplication of effort and to pro-
13 Letter from Joseph L. Sax to Mrs. Willard E. Wolfe, Feb. 4, 1969.
14 The Sierra Club, a non-profit California membership corporation, was founded in
1892 and now has over eighty thousand members. The stated purpose of the Sierra Club is
the preservation of scenic resources, forests, waters, wildlife and wilderness. This has been
achieved largely through extensive educational programs and, more recently, by legal
actions.
The West Michigan Environmental Action Council is an unincorporated association. Its
membership, which consists of twenty-five civic organizations and over three hundred
individuals, assists in coordinating the activities of individuals and organizations concerned
with the protection and restoration of the environment.
Other organizations forming the Coalition include the Michigan United Conservation
[VOL. 4:2
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vide organizational efficiency, these groups joined an umbrella
organization known as the "Coalition to Pass H.B. 3055." The
Coalition, working through constituent groups, became the bill's
primary proponent.
The Democratic representative who was co-chairman of the
House Conservation and Recreation Committee was asked to
introduce the bill. His selection may have been crucial to the
eventual passage of the law, for the Michigan House was con-
trolled by a Democratic majority and the bill was referred to the
Conservation and Recreation Committee.
Following the introduction of the bill, preparations were made
for the first public hearing. Believing that the ultimate success of
H.B. 3055 depended upon the amount of public support that
could be generated, the proponents of the bill devoted substantial
amounts of time and energy to assuring that the first and every
subsequent public hearing were well attended, and that the wit-
nesses for the bill were prepared to present well-documented
testimony. Notice of each meeting was distributed by various
means to the membership of all interested organizations and,
judging by the number of people who attended, each hearing was
considered by the proponents of H.B. 3055 to be entirely success-
ful. 15
Recognizing the more parochial and immediate political reali-
ties confronting passage of the bill, the proponents attempted to
secure the support of both Republicans and Democrats. In this
effort, the Coalition benefitted from the fact that 1970 was an
election year. With an increasing public awareness of and concern
for environmental issues, neither party wished to become known
as an opponent of the bill. Since the Coalition had previously
secured support from the Democrats in the state legislature, it
focussed its efforts on the Republican Governor and his adminis-
tration16 whose endorsement would undoubtedly have been help-
ful in enlisting the support of Republican members of the legisla-
ture.
An initial setback to the Coalition's efforts to gain gubernatorial
support took the form of an unfavorable "analysis" by the Attor-
ney General. 17 This analysis, issued three weeks after H.B. 3055
Clubs, Trout Unlimited, the Audubon Society, The Izaak Walton League, Environmental
Action for Survival (a student group at the University of Michigan) and the University of
Michigan Environmental Law Society.
15 Mrs. Willard E. Wolfe, History of House Bill 3055, (not dated) (unpublished manu-
script in the files of Professor Sax, University of Michigan Law School).
168 The Republican Governor of the State of Michigan was William G. Milliken.
17Attorney General Frank J. Kelley, Analysis of House Bill 3055, April 21, 1969
(unpublished analysis in the files of Professor Sax, University of Michigan Law School).
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was introduced, set forth several grounds underlying the Attorney
General's opposition to the bill: (1) the bill was not needed in
view of present 'statutes which provide means for citizens to file
complaints with state agencies to initiate correction of state law
violators; (2) the bill could disrupt presently established and prov-
en state agency methods and procedures; and (3) the bill might
encourage the initiation of spurious suits.' 8 Although most state
agencies felt obligated to adopt the opinions of the Attorney
General, the Department of Natural Resources, striking a more
independent course, released the first of its analyses of H.B. 3055,
immediately preceding the first public hearing, supporting the bill
and suggesting only some "purely mechanical and minor"
changes. 19 The fact that some public agencies expressed approval
of the bill not only thwarted any attempt to present a united
agency opposition, but also cast some doubt on the Attorney
General's argument that to allow individual suits in the environ-
mental arena would impede administrative efforts in this area.20
As it turned out, the Governor looked neither to the Attorney
General, who was a Democrat, nor to the state agencies for
guidance in formulating his position on H.B. 3055. Since the
Governor was not a lawyer, he generally relied on his appointed
Republican Legal Advisor 21 for "objective" legal counsel as well
as for liaison activities with the legislature. This advisor was
presumably the source of legal information utilized by the Gover-
nor in forming an opinion regarding the bill.
Soon after the first public hearing, the Legal Advisor submitted
his analysis of H.B. 3055 to the Governor, 22 and assumed a
neutral position by limiting his report to an outline of the bill's
provisions commenting only on certain "weak" sections. His ma-
jor concern with the bill was the absence of any "definite stan-
dards" to guide the courts in actions brought under the proposed
I1 Id.
19 Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, Analysis of House Bill No. 3055, January 20,
1970 (unpublished analysis in the files of Professor Sax, University of Michigan Law
School).20 The major state agency to publicly state its opposition to H.B. 3055 was the Depart-
ment of Public Health, which is also responsible for air pollution control in Michigan.
The first analysis by the Dep't of Pub. Health was issued on the day of the initial public
hearing and expressed objections to the bill similar to those voiced by the Attorney
General nearly a year before. Michigan Dep't of Public Health, Analysis of House Bill
3055, (not dated) (unpublished analysis in the files of Professor Sax, University of Mich-
igan Law School).
21 The Governor's legal advisor was Joseph H. Thibodeau.
22 J. Thibodeau, Memorandum to Governor Milliken on House Bill 3055, January 26,
1970 (unpublished memorandum in the files of Professor Sax, University of Michigan Law
School).
[VOL. 4:2
WINTER 1970] Michigan Environmental Protection Act
act, and the inclusion of several terms which he felt should be
more specifically defined.23
By the time this analysis was made available to legislators and
the public, interest in H.B. 3055 had grown considerably and the
strength of its advocates had increased proportionally. Public
hearings were being held across the state adding to the already
high level of enthusiasm surrounding the bill. 2 4 The Governor was
probably feeling pressure to take a stand on the bill, and although
the proponents were not certain of the Governor's endorsement,
they thought it would be extremely difficult, given the tremendous
public support, for him to actively oppose it.
Approximately two months after submitting his initial analysis
to the Governor, the Legal Advisor presented another expanded
analysis to the House Committee on Conservation and Recrea-
tion. Although expressing the Governor's support for the concept
underlying the bill,25 he clearly intimated that the Governor's
support was to be contingent upon certain changes in the phrase-
ology of the bill. The Governor's major recommendations in re-
gard to the definitional problem were: (1) insertion of the word
"unreasonable" before the phrase "pollution, impairment or de-
struction" wherever it appeared in the bill; (2) insertion of the
phrase "considering all relevant surrounding circumstances and
factors" before any mention of a "feasible and prudent alternative
to defendant's conduct;" and (3) deletion of the term "public
trust" wherever it appeared in the bill. 26
The proponents objected to these definitional changes asserting
23 Id. at 2. These terms were "impairment, pollution or destruction of the public trust or
air, water or other natural resources of the state," "reasonably likely," and "feasible and
prudent alternative consistent with the reasonable requirements of the public health, safety
and welfare."
24 Several public hearings on H.B. 3055 were held during the 1970 legislative session,
providing samplings of the dimension of public support. In addition, the hearings provided
a forum for the discussion of proposed amendments to the bill.
2J. Thibodeau, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: Panacea or Pan-
dora's Box, 116 CONG. REC. S16,247 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970).
21J. Thibodeau, Analysis of House Bill 3055, at 6, March 18, 1970 (unpublished
analysis in the files of Professor Sax, University of Michigan Law School). Thibodeau
stated that he wanted to eliminate "public trust" for purposes of "clarification," because he
saw no legal significance to the term. Some of the language, e.g., "other natural resources"
and "pollution, impairment or destruction," had been taken directly from art. 4, § 52 of the
1963 MICH. CONST. and, the proponents argued, to define it may give it more or less scope
than intended. This same sentiment was expressed by Professor William Pierce of the
University of Michigan Law School. Testimony of Professor Pierce before Michigan
House of Representatives Committee on Conservation and Recreation, at 19, March 12,
1970 (unpublished testimony in the files of Professor Sax, University of Michigan Law
School).
On the floor of the House, the term "public trust" was maintained in the bill and the
language "consideration of surrounding circumstances" was omitted.
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that an innovative act demands flexibility in its execution and that
the courts should at least be allowed the freedom to adopt new
and different approaches to individual protection of the environ-
ment. Nevertheless, to obtain the Governor's support, several of
his suggestions were incorporated into a substitute bill which was
drafted by his Legal Advisor after consulting with University of
Michigan Law Professors Pierce and Sax.27
Although the substitute bill was reported out of the House
Committee on Conservation and Recreation by a vote of twelve
to one, some committee members and several of the proponents
outside the legislature were still dissatisfied with the Governor's
modifications. The fact that the substitute rather than the original
bill was reported out of the committee chaired by the sponsor of
H.B. 3055 was interpreted by many legislators to be indicative of
the great importance attached by the proponents to the Gover-
nor's support. 28 Nevertheless, the substitute measure did not pass
the House without furth& dispute and alteration. The con-
servationist groups decided to oppose on the floor the insertion,
made pursuant to the Governor's recommendation, of the word
"unreasonable" before the phrase "pollution, impairment or de-
struction" wherever it appeared in the bill for fear the word might
establish a "loophole" in the bill. 29 This one word became the sole
point of heated partisan disagreement. The majority of Republi-
cans favored retention of the word on the ground that it would
provide some guideline for the courts in enforcing the Act. How-
ever, the House Democrats, outnumbering the Republicans
fifty-seven to fifty-three, were joined by a few Republicans and
successfully voted to delete "unreasonable" from the bill.30 More-
over, the other two amendments recommended by the Governor
were also deleted from the final version of the bill.
Opposition to H.B. 3055 came from two principal sources:
state manufacturers and regulatory agencies. However, because
of the early widespread skepticism of the bill's chances of suc-
cess, and because of the hesitancy of many manufacturers to
27 Personal Interview with Joseph H. Thibodeau, October 9, 1970.
28 Subsequent to the committee's adoption of the substitute bill, the Governor's office
issued a press release stating that he now supported the bill "not only in concept, but in its
present substituted form." Governor William G. Milliken, Press Release, Lansing, Mich-
igan, Mar. 31, 1970 (in the files of Professor Sax, University of Michigan Law School).
2Thibodeau, supra note 25, at S16,252.
30 The general consensus of the parties involved in the argument over "unreasonable"
was that it was not a significant legal issue. Professor Sax stated that he would prefer the
word not be included in the bill but that it was not important enough to warrant extended
debate. Concern was expressed that if the word took on much significance courts might be
inclined somehow to limit their interpretation of the bill's overall effect; but the argument
over "unreasonable" was primarily political, and not legal.
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publicly oppose an environmental protection proposal, opposition
to the bill never became especially strong or vocal. Similarly,
because of their concern for public opinion, individual manufac-
turers remained in the background and allowed the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce to wage the major fight against the bill.
One important consequence of this strategy was to make the
outpouring of support for the bill seem all the more impressive.
For example, at public hearings on H.B. 3055 only a very few of
the hundreds of participants and spectators were opposed to the
bill.
As public support for the measure grew, the organizations
opposing the bill became more concerned with the potential im-
pact of individual provisions rather than with the chances of the
bill as a whole. Instead of broadside attacks, the opposition began
to think in realistic terms of ways in which the scope of the bill
could be narrowed. Thus, the battle between those for and those
against was reduced to a dispute over whether the proposal would
be adopted in broad terms allowing for the development of an
environmental common law for Michigan, or whether the proposal
would be more limited in scope.
Several amendments were offered which, in effect, would have
drastically limited the scope of H.B. 3055. The first of these
amendments, offered by the Water Resources Commission and
supported by the Attorney General, other regulatory agencies,
and the various manufacturing organizations, would have required
a plaintiff bringing suit under the Act to file a petition with the
court for leave to commence an action.3 1 The plaintiff would have
to show, in the petition, that all germane administrative proce-
dures had been exhausted or the suit would be dismissed. In view
of the fact that the amendment was introduced by the Water
Resources Commission, one of the two state "watch-dog"
agencies (the other being the Air Pollution Control Commission),
it is not unreasonable to conclude that the motivation for the
amendment was, in part, a defensive reaction on the part of these
agencies to the central premise of the bill that existing environ-
mental protection agencies were not responsive to the needs of
the public. Another of the underlying bases for the amendment
was the consideration often raised during legislative debates of
whether the courts are competent to hear these complex questions
of environmental quality which have traditionally been deter-
mined by administrative agencies. Thus, the amendment was de-
l Letter from Ralph W. Purdy, Executive Secretary, Michigan Water Resources Com-
mission, to Representative Thomas Anderson, March 6, 1970.
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signed to ensure that persons could not circumvent normal admin-
istrative procedures, and to make it easier for the court to dismiss
the suit so that the agencies would not be constantly called upon
to provide information for these suits. These agency objections to
H.B. 3055 were substantially quieted, however, by the sub-
sequent support given the bill, without the proposed change, by
the Attorney General. Not only did the Attorney General's rever-
sal of opinion place the weight of the state's legal advisor behind
the bill, but because of his official position, the agencies in large
part felt bound by his opinion.3 2
A second issue dealt with what the Chamber of Commerce
considered to be the problem of spurious and harassment suits.
The Chamber of Commerce offered a number of solutions by way
of amendments, the most significant being that the Attorney Gen-
eral should have the power to review and "dismiss a complaint if
he determines that no public interest is involved."33 (Emphasis
added). This proposal, in effect, would have given the Attorney
General the power to make a final, non-appealable decision on
whether a suit could be brought to trial -a determination the
proponents felt would be more suitable for the judiciary. Those
supporting the bill without the amendment set forth two reasons
for not adopting the proposed change. First, in many cases the
Attorney General would be the defendant's lawyer (e.g., in a suit
against a regulatory agency) and surely should not in that capacity
have veto power over plaintiffs case. Second, it was argued that
H.B. 3055 had a built-in safeguard against frivolous or spurious
suits .in that such claims are not only easily defeated but are
generally more costly to the plaintiff than to the defendant. Al-
though the above proposal was never voted upon by the legisla-
ture, concern over the possibility of frivolous suits did result in
the adoption of an amendment allowing the court to require the
plaintiff to post a bond or cash not in excess of five hundred
dollars. 34
Following passage of the substitute bill in the House, 35 the
32 This reversal of the Attorney General's position on tfle bill was initially made known
during the University of Michigan's, March, 1970 teach-in on the environment. Letter
from Frank J. Kelley, Michigan Attorney General, to Douglas Scott, Co-chairman of
ENACT, March 6, 1970.
3 Michigan Chamber of Commerce. State Legislation Report, No. SL 2-70, at 2, Feb.
27, 1970 (unpublished report in the files of Professor Sax, University of Michigan Law
School).
34 The Michigan Manufacturers Association had lobbied for an increase to three thou-
sand dollars. Michigan Manufacturers Association, Statement on House Bill 3055 by Mr.
Dwight Vincent, May 13, 1970 (unpublished manuscript in the files of Professor Sax,
University of Michigan Law School).
35 The second substitute for H.B. 3055 was passed by the Michigan House of Represen-
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Chamber of Commerce introduced an amendment in the Senate
concerning the problem of burden of proof. Section three of the
bill, as passed by the House, provided that when the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case, the defendant could show, by way
of affirmative defenses, that there is not a feasible and prudent
alternative to his conduct "and that such conduct is consistent
with the promotion of the public health, safety and welfare in light
of the state's paramount concern for the protection of its natural
resources from pollution, impairment or destruction. ' 3 6 (Empha-
sis added). Although those who were in favor of the bill as it
passed the House argued that this provision merely made certain
that the defendant would explain his conduct, the Chamber of
Commerce considered it to be the imposition of an "almost im-
possible burden on any defendant."37 They consequently pro-
posed an amendment to change the "and" to "or" thereby giving
the defendant the option of showing either that no feasible and
prudent alternative to his conduct exists or "that such conduct is
consistent with the promotion of the public health."38 The oppo-
nents of the proposed amendment asserted that by permitting a
defendant to continue conduct for which he could show there was
no feasible and prudent alternative, even though inconsistent with
the promotion of the public health, the efficacy of the bill would
be seriously impaired; conduct damaging to the environment
could continue for an indefinite period of time subject to little, if
any, public restraint.3 9 Although the Senate Committee on Con-
servation and Tourist Industry reported this amendment out with
tatives by a ninety-eight to three vote and sent to the Republican-controlled (twenty to
eighteen) Senate. MicH. H.R. JoUR., No. 57, at 1297, 75th Cong. Reg. Sess. (1970).
36The theory underlying this provision was that the defendant would have access to
information not readily obtainable by plaintiffs, and therefor should
have considered all reasonable alternatives and to have chosen the best of
those available; to ask him to support his decision is merely to require that-he
reveal the process which he must already have undertaken, if he has planned
rationally and with consideration for the public interest. He has the under-
lying data and documentation upon which his choice of a given course of
action is based.
Pierce, Sax & Irwin, Responses to "Thoughts on H.B. 3055," at 4, March 20, 1970
(unpublished manuscript in the files of Professor Sax, University of Michigan Law
School). This section was designed to discourage "the common practice of assuming that a
particular plan would go through, thereby failing to thoroughly examine the alternatives."
Id.
37 Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, Special Legal Subcommittee, Recommended
Amendments to H.B. 3055, at 1, March 4, 1970 (unpublished report in the files of
Professor Sax, University of Michigan Law School).
3 8 ld. at 2.
39 State Representative Thomas J. Anderson, Memorandum to Members of the Senate
with reference to H.B. 3055, June 16, 1970 (unpublished memorandum in the files of
Professor Sax, University of Michigan Law School).
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a favorable recommendation, it was defeated on the floor of the:
Senate.40
The Chamber of Commerce also submitted an amendment
which would allow as affirmative defenses, "compliance with
existing standards set by rule or law," and the "state of the art
defense," 41 i.e., that the technology necessary for control of this
particular type of pollution had not been developed or made
available. The Chamber of Commerce asserted that it would be
unfair to penalize the defendant for his good faith attempt to meet
existing regulations. 42 An alternative amendment submitted by
proponents of the bill explicitly rejecting the Chamber's sugges-
tion was enacted by the Senate: the courts may determine the
"validity, applicability and reasonableness" of standards set by
rule or law, and, if found to be deficient, "direct the adoption of a
[more appropriate] standard." 43 This amendment was drafted to
ensure that the court would not dismiss an action simply because
the industry was complying with promulgated standards. It was
successfully argued that plaintiffs should be given the opportunity
to prove that the agency standards were inconsistent with the
bill's legal standards of environmental protection. Thus, both the
polluter and the appropriate agency could be forced to improve
their attempts to alleviate damage caused the environment.
Conclusion
Several factors combined fortuitously to bring about the pas-
sage of H.B. 3055. First, relatively few organizers, aided by
extensive media coverage, were able to stimulate public aware-
ness of the environmental crisis and attract the support of thou-
sands of citizens. Second, important political leaders reacted to
the public support by aligning themselves with the bill's propo-
nents. Third, the chairman of the committee to which the bill
would be referred was chosen as the sponsor of the proposal
before the legislature. Fourth, the Governor, Attorney General
and most state departments eventually saw fit to add their sup-
port, further reducing the possibilities of political fragmentation of
this issue. Fifth, the objections of the regulatory agencies were
rather cautiously advanced in view of the formidable public sup-
port, the support of the Attorney General, and the strong backing
of the bill by the Department of Natural Resources. Sixth, the
40 MICH. S. JOUR., No. 95, at 1628, 75th Cong. Reg. Sess. (1970).
41 Letter from Peter W. Steketee to State Senator Basil W. Brown, May 29, 1970.
42 Id.
43 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1202(2)(a), (b) (Supp. 1971).
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major industries let the Michigan Chamber of Commerce fight the
battle for them, giving the opponents but a single, though poten-
tially powerful, voice. Finally, most of the strength of the opposi-
tion was never able to reach its potential because of a failure to
accurately appraise the overwhelming public support from the
outset of the campaign. As a result, the proponents of H.B. 3055
successfully opposed the attempts to limit the possible effect of
the legislation, thereby achieving enactment of an instrument
which should allow the development of an environmental common
law.*
* This note is a revised and edited version of a study prepared by John A. Watts from
material compiled by Donald Dworsky, Patrick McCauley, Michael D. McGuire and John
A. Watts for a course in environmental law at the University of Michigan Law School.
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II. MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS
A. Introduction
With the enactment of the Environmental Protection Act of
1970, the Michigan legislature has enabled any state citizen to
institute legal action against polluters of the environment.1 Be-
cause of the large number of possible plaintiffs -eight million
Michigan citizens-a potential problem exists of excessive
anti-pollution litigation and a multiplicity of suits against any
single polluter's activity. The possibility of multiple suits entails
complex and conflicting interests. While the general public shares
an interest with potential defendants in avoiding further encum-
brance of overloaded courts by repeated litigation on identical
questions, the people of Michigan, particularly potential plaintiffs
under the Act, also have an interest in ensuring that claims are
fully and fairly litigated.
The defendants' interest can perhaps best be illustrated by a
hypothetical situation in which individuals living adjacent to a
factory sue the owner under the Environmental Protection Act to
compel installation of anti-pollution devices. If the court rules
favorably to plaintiff, other environmentalists would have no de-
sire to relitigate the issue, but if the court rules unfavorably,
parties not involved in the initial litigation may bring numerous
new actions against the polluter. Such redundant litigation com-
pels the owner to defend himself against repeated attacks based
on identical claims, and may well hinder environmental reform by
provoking adverse reaction from the judiciary and the general
public.
The multiplicity problem, however, cannot be equitably re-
solved by having the initial suit against any particular act of
alleged pollution preclude further litigation. Since the original
plaintiff may have been poorly financed, inadequately represented,
or may have sought inappropriate or inadequate relief,2 the fore-
closure of subsequent litigation would radically curtail the
' MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-1207 (Supp. 1971). Prior to the enactment of
the Environmental Protection Act of 1970, environmental contamination went unchal-
lenged, since the right to sue polluters was limited to attorneys general and other govern-
ment agencies.
2 This problem becomes particularly complicated in view of the fact that the Environ-
mental Protection Act gives standing not only to individual citizens, but also to the
Attorney General and to other state and local government agencies (as well as to corpo-
rations, partnerships and other private legal entities). MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 691.1202 (Supp. 1971). The previously dismal record of a number of governmental
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effectiveness of the new Act. The purpose of this note is to
explore the extent to which multiplicity problems will actually
arise, to examine whether any existing legal techniques can be
applied to solve such problems, and to suggest new techniques to
deal with multiplicity problems.
B.1 Possible Extent of the Multiplicity Problem
Relitigatibn of issues previously argued on the merits is unlike-
ly for several reasons.3 Environmentalists will realize that re-
peated attempts to gain injunctive relief against an alleged polluter
on the basis of facts and law previously considered by a court will
probably afford no positive results. Moreover, the high financial
costs of bringing complicated environmental suits4 will undoubt-
edly have a chilling effect on multiple litigation since environmen-
tal groups are unlikely to squander their resources relitigating
hopeless causes. 5
The court's power to consolidate will also tend to curtail multi-
plicity where concurrently pending actions involve a common
issue of law or fact. 6 Although the Michigan court rules require
agencies in acting on environmental matters and their apparent willingness to compromise
many environmental cases suggests that it could be catastrophic if actions by government
units could preclude subsequent suits by individuals.
3 A look at the experience with multiple suits in the antitrust area can help to put the
problem in perspective. Similar to the new Environmental Protection Act, the federal
antitrust laws broadly open the way to repeated suits against the same defendant. In
addition to the possibility of treble damage actions by potentially huge numbers of con-
sumers or competitors, an antitrust violator may also be subject to actions by the Justice
Department and/or the Federal Trade Commission. Nonetheless, the federal courts have
never felt it necessary to take steps to deter multiple suits. A defendant's success in a civil
suit brought by the Justice Department does not preclude a private treble damage action
on the same claim. Conversely, government victory in a civil action is sure to open the
way for successful private litigation based on an identical theory. Nor does one unsuccess-
ful (or successful) private action bar subsequent private actions by anyone other than those
party to the first action. Most revealingly, defendant's victory in an action brought by the
government will not preclude a later government suit on the same theory on defendant's
repetition of the very conduct held lawful in the prior suit. Despite this relative freedom
from restriction on multiple suits, chaos has not resulted. Although there are some special
factors working against the possibility of multiple suits in the antitrust area such as
financial considerations, particularly related to the availability of damages and the fact that
far fewer people are eager to litigate to protect the economy than the environment, the
antitrust experience does suggest that the multiple suit problem is largely self-regulating.
See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, §§ 145-70 (1967).4 0n the complexity of environmental cases, see Sive, Securing, Examining, and
Cross-Examining Expert Witnesses in Environmental Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1175
(1970).
5 This is particularly true when one considers that most on-going environmental groups
considering the possibility of relitigating a previously litigated problem would be faced with
the much more reasonable alternative of committing their resources to litigation against
some other environmental problem or polluter.6 See 2 J. HONIGMAN & C. HAWKINS, MICHIGAN COURT RULES ANNOTATED, R. 505
(2d ed. 1963).
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the common issue to be "substantial or controlling," 7 it is clear
that both the legal and factual issues in any two suits under the
Environmental Protection Act will be identical regardless of the
plaintiffs, 8 which means that the process of consolidation, as well
as the management of consolidated suits, should be relatively
easy. 9 In addition, the venue provision of the Act authorizing
suits to be brought only where an alleged violation occurs will
facilitate consolidation by eliminating the problem of consoli-
dating actions pending in the different circuit courts. 10
Other constraints will exist where the third or fourth party
asserting the same environmental claim was influenced by an
improper motive (e.g., harassment), for the court has the power to
apply the clean hands doctrine and dismiss the action.' Similarly,
in extreme cases of multiplicity where the plaintiff has failed to
join in prior suits against a particular act of pollution and is,
thereby, guilty of unconscionable delay, the doctrine of laches is
applicable.12 More generally, a court, in "doing equity" between
the parties to an action brought under the Environmental Protec-
tion Act, can look askance at a party who is merely relitigating a
previously litigated case.1 3
Finally, the doctrine of stare decisis may dissuade some poten-
7 
MICH. GEN. CT. R. 505.1. The federal consolidation rule, FED. R. Civ. PRo. 42, is
identical to the Michigan rule, except that it omits this language.
8 The issue of fact will always involve defendant's conduct resulting in pollution, and the
issue of law will always involve the Environmental Protection Act of 1970.
9 Relating to innovative techniques of dealing with a consolidated case, see In re Texas
City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952), aff'd sub nom. Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), which involved the consolidation of 273 suits brought by
approximately 8,500 claimants. On the practical considerations governing consolidation,
see Journapak Corp. v. Bair, 27 F.R.D. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
'o MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202 (Supp. 1971).
11 Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78 (1911).
12 Cases on the use of laches against unconscionable delay are collected at 34 A.L.R.2d
1314 (1954).
13 Indeed, as a practical matter, the venue provision of H.B. 3055, MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 691.1202(2) (Supp. 1971), requiring suits to be brought where alleged pollution
occurs, is likely to create judicial impatience with successive suits under the Act. Because
of the venue provision successive suits will be tried in the same circuit court, possibly
before the same judge. It is perfectly reasonable that a judge, having previously tried a suit
against a given defendant, would be somewhat displeased to find himself rehearing an
identical case brought by a new plaintiff. One particularly important area of judicial
discretion would be in the area of temporary injunctive relief since many environmental
suits turn on the plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction. For example, if an Environmental Protection Act suit seeks to halt the tim-
bering of a forest area, preliminary relief until the case could be tried would be essential to
the plaintiff lest his case become moot. Most courts might properly find the basis for such
relief wanting if the same case had previously been carried to judgment by different
plaintiffs. One of the few real incentives for multiple suits could be the prospect of
interminably delaying a project by tying it up in preliminary injunctions while successive
suits were litigated. Denial of such temporary relief would, of course, eliminate this
prospect.
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tial plaintiffs from relitigating issues previously adjudicated. 14
Since environmental cases are likely to raise more novel issues of
law than the typical lawsuit, it is probable that a fair number of
decisions in environmental cases will be decided on legal rather
than factual grounds, particularly during the first few years when
the courts are building a new common law of environmental
disruption. If a first suit has turned on a legal point, potential
plaintiffs will surely be reluctant to file a second identical case,
since doing so would be likely to produce nothing more than
summary judgment in defendant's favor.
C. Some Traditional Solutions
1. Single Forum Solution
The most direct solution to the problem of multiple suits is to
bring all potential litigants into the courtroom whenever an action
under the Act is commenced. In this way, a single suit would have
binding effect upon all future litigants under the doctrine of res
judicata. 15 This solution, however, seems utterly impractical.
Leaving aside the question of whether there are any presently
known devices which the courts may use to bring all potential
litigants under the Environmental Protection Act into the same
courtroom, it is perfectly clear that it is not practical to force eight
million or so people (plus assorted government agencies and pri-
vate groups) to attempt to work together in the same suit. Though
no such extreme solution seems feasible, the possibilities for
bringing a substantial number of interested parties into an initial
suit under the Act are worthy of discussion.
2. Joinder
Compulsory joinder is a device traditionally used to promote
judicial economy by requiring persons with similar or related
interest in the subject matter of the litigation to be present before
14 The determination of a point of law by a court will generally be followed by a court of
the same or a lower rank if a subsequent case presents the same legal problem, although
different parties are involved in the subsequent case. Stare decisis is a matter of judicial
policy and is motivated by the need to promote certainty, stability and predictability in the
law. See, e.g., Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205 (1910); Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d
642 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 678 (1941).
15 The doctrine of res judicata is that a final judgment rendered upon the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of causes of action and of facts and issues
thereby litigated as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or any
other court of concurrent jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960);
United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502 (1953); Commissioner v. Sunnen,
333 U.S. 591 (1948); Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506 (1897).
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the court. 16 In addition to reducing the number of actions neces-
sary to dispose of a claim against a particular defendant, com-
pulsory joinder guards against one person affecting the interests of
others without allowing them to participate in the disposition of
the matter. 17
To qualify for compulsory joinder, essential parties must be
found who have an interest in the action or without whom com-
plete relief cannot be granted.18 If such parties are found but
cannot be joined, the question becomes whether the action should
proceed in their absence. 19 The joinder statutes provide the
framework for determining who qualifies as a necessary party and
whether the action should proceed without his joinder. The most
18 For a general treatment of compulsory joinder in the State of Michigan see I J.
HONIGMAN & C. HAWKINS, MICHIGAN COURT RULES ANNOTATED, R. 205 (2d ed 1962).
For federal procedure see 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 19.1 et seq. (2d ed. 1969);
2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 511 et seq.
(Wright ed. 1961) (see pocketpart for 1966 amendment). For a discussion of compulsory
joinder in general see Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure -Rule 19 and Indispensable
Parties, 65 MICH. L. REV. 968 (1967); Comment, The Litigant and the Absentee in
Federal Multiparty Practice, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 531 (1968).
17 Stevens v. Loomis, 334 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1964); Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 270
F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 962 (1960).
18 Many jurisdictions determine those required to be joined through categorization of
parties. As first articulated by the Supreme Court in Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.)
130, 139 (1854), parties were:
1. Formal parties. 2. Persons having an interest in the controversy, and who
ought to be made parties, in order that the court may act on that rule which
requires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy, and do
complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it. These persons are
commonly termed necessary parties .... 3. Persons who not only have an
interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final decree
cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the con-
troversy in such a condition that its final termination may be wholly in-
consistent with equity and good conscience.
These latter parties were called indispensable parties. However, these categories, used by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure until 1966 when a major revision of Rule 19 was
accomplished, tended to become too important, losing sight of more important consid-
erations.
19 The most frequent reason for non-joinder of interested parties is lack of jurisdiction.
An action brought under the Environmental Protection Act of 1970 would be able to use
the Michigan long arm statute which gives Michigan courts jurisdiction over persons with
the necessary contacts in the state. MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 600.701 (1968). See also I J.
HONIGMAN & HAWKINS, supra note 16, R. 105.9. Any person who owns land within
Michigan is also subject to limited jurisdiction of the courts. MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.705 (1968). In addition, any land in the state is subject to a Michigan court's
jurisdiction whether or not the owner is under the court's jurisdiction. MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.751 (1968). Inasmuch as many environmental actions will involve land and the
damage to that land, the Michigan courts should be able to maintain jurisdiction over the
owners of the damaged property if for some reason the party did not join voluntarily. One
possible plaintiff over whom the court would not be able to exercise jurisdiction without
his consent is the plaintiff who lives across the border in Ohio or Indiana and wishes to
sue a Michigan defendant under the Environmental Protection Act for damage to his air,
water or other reasons. Nothing in the bill limits plaintiffs to Michigan residents; however,
even if this plaintiff could not be brought within the jurisdiction of the court, it is unlikely
that a court would find that the action could not be equitably maintained without him.
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relevant considerations are: whether failure to join this person
would result in a multiplicity of suits, putting an unnecessary
burden on the courts and causing harassment to the defendant;20
whether a judgment without this person would have an adverse
effect upon his rights as well as the rights of those already par-
ties;21 whether the court would be able to render a valid judg-
ment;22 whether the plaintiff would be able to assert his claim
elsewhere if the court dismisses the action for failure to join this
person;23 whether the court could fashion a decree in such a way
as to eliminate prejudice to all persons involved.2 4
Under the Environmental Protection Act, compulsory joinder
is probably inappropriate since the plaintiff does not fit within
traditional concepts of an essential party. The crucial factor for
joinder is the interest that the parties share which is generally
thought to be an interest in the same dollars or in the same piece
of property.2 5 Without the necessary common interest, there is no
compulsory joinder. No such specific interest would normally be
present in a suit brought under the new Act. Since no damage
amount is relevant, money is of no concern. Similarly, no interest
exists in a particular piece of property, only an interest in attack-
ing ways in which certain properties are used.
Compulsory joinder also seems unlikely because, under the
Environmental Protection Act, the right of one plaintiff to sue is
separable from another's right to sue the same defendant on the
same claim.2 6 One person can ask for equitable relief without
affecting the rights of another to bring a similar action. This
20See MICH. GEN. CT. R. 205.2(8); FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(ii).
21 See MICH. GEN. CT. R. 205.2(3); FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
2 2 See MICH. GEN. CT. R. 205.2(1); FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
23 See MICH. GEN. CT. R. 205.2(2); FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
24See MICH. GEN. CT. R. 205.2(4); FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
25 E.g., when an insurance company is sued by the federal government to recover the
value of an insurance policy issued to a delinquent taxpayer, the insured is a required party
because his money and rights in the insurance policy are being affected. Likewise, a suit
for patent infringement by the owner of the patent required the joinder of the licensee
where the owner had agreed to join the licensee in such suits. Each had an interest in the
patent that would be materially affected by the outcome of the litigation. See United States
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F. Supp. 30 (D. Conn. 1942); Norvell v. McGraw-Edison Co.,
270 F. Supp. 57 (E.D. Wis. 1967).26The Environmental Protection Act of 1970 does not recognize any peculiar legal
interests on the part of persons particularly affected by a given act of environmental
disruption. Rather, and quite properly, all persons in the state stand in the same legal
position with respect to any such act. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1202(2)(1) (Supp. 1970)
provides: "The attorney general, any political subdivision of the state, any instrumentality
or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership,
corporation, association, organization or other legal entity may maintain an action in the
circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is likely to
occur ....
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separability of claims provided by the statute itself inhibits at-
tempts to join all such claims. Even when the Environmental
Protection Act case is compared to a tort action where defendant
injures several persons at once giving rise to the same claim by
each injured party, joinder would not necessarily follow, there
being no requirement under traditional notions of joinder and due
process that all those injured in a single incident be joined. 27 Thus
it does not seem likely under the usual concept of compulsory
joinder that possible plaintiffs under the Act can be required to
join together in the action. 28
Even assuming joinder could be required, in order to solve the
multiplicity problem by having the greatest number of possible
plaintiffs bound by the disposition of the action, it would be
necessary to join everyone in the state. The costs of this endeavor
would be tremendous. In the first place, all potential plaintiffs
must be notified of their joinder.29 If the cost of notification is to
be borne by the plaintiff, as it most likely would be, he would
undoubtedly be discouraged from continuing the suit.3 0 Even if he
did continue, the fact of having eight million people tied together
in the same suit would be more disruptive of the judicial process,
as well as more burdensome to defendants, than would be a
multiplicity of suits.3 ' Because this would be the only opportunity
for plaintiffs to be heard, each plaintiff could be expected to exert
as much energy in the joint trial as he would had he been allowed
to bring a separate action. As much court time would be con-
sumed in hearing motions and arguments,3 2 and the defendant
would have to answer as many interrogatories and attend as many
depositions as would have been necessary in a series of suits.
27 In tort actions, joinder is relevant only to codefendants; joint tortfeasors may be sued
severally or individually. See, e.g., Tower v. Camp, 103 Conn. 41, 130 A. 86 (1925);
Wrabek v. Suchomel, 145 Minn. 468, 177 N.W. 764 (1920); Hoosier Stone Co. v.
McCain, 133 Ind. 231, 31 N.E. 956 (1892).
28The parties may choose to join together and would be entitled to do so under
permissive joinder statutes, but this does not solve the problem of multiple plaintiffs who
do not desire to sue together.
2 The notice problem is analogous to that arising in class actions. See Northview Const.
Co. v. City of St. Clair Shores, 12 Mich. App. 104, 162 N.W.2d 297 (1968); see also
discussion of class actions in subsection C infra.
30 An example of the costs which would be incurred here is found in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). In that case, the cost of providing personal notice
to 3,750,000 persons was estimated at $400,000.
31 Some indication of the procedural problems which would be posed in this situation
can be seen in In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952), affd sub
nor. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). Management of this action, involving
the consolidation of 273 suits with eighty-five thousand plaintiffs, was accomplished by
using committees of plaintiffs' attorneys.
32 Indeed, with repeated suits, the doctrine of stare decisis might eliminate some of the
arguments raised in a single multiple party suit.
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Furthermore, with such a large group, stipulations on anything
would be impossible. Finally, a plaintiff joined in this action might
be forced into a position in which it would be difficult for him to
properly present his case. For example, he might be required to
join at a time inconvenient to him either in terms of finances or in
terms of collecting necessary information. Every time he wished
to file a motion or request interrogatories there would be pres-
sures from other plaintiffs to do so in a different fashion. The cost
of notifying all the plaintiffs of actions he takes during the course
of the trial would be quite high and might well discourage him
from taking necessary strategic actions. Thus, the notion of re-
quiring every person in the state to join in a single suit in order to
avoid the multiplicity problem would create far more complex
problems than would the multiple suits.
3. Class Actions33
The class suit has significant advantages over joinder as a
device to limit litigation to a single suit binding upon all sub-
sequent plaintiffs litigating the same claim against the same de-
fendant. For example, the class suit permits the court to hear
actions on behalf of large numbers of people without the necessity
of jamming the courtrooms with litigants and their attorneys. 34 As
one commentator notes, a class action "can achieve economies in
the administration of the court system and in the enforcement of
[the] numerous claims." 35 Also, courts have greater flexibility in
administering a class action than would be possible in cases of
mass joinder. Many class action rules, including the present Fed-
eral Rule 23 and Michigan Rule 208, grant the presiding judge
33 For a general treatment of the subject of class actions, with a focus on Federal Rule
23, see The Class Action: A Symposium, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 497 (1969). On
Michigan Rules, see Meisenholder, The New Michigan Pre-Trial Procedural
Rules-Models for Other States?, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1389 (1963). A general survey of the
types of class actions available in the different states can be found in Starrs, The Con-
sumer Class Action-Part /I: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U.L. REV. 407 (1969).
Generally, four divergent types of class actions are recognized. The oldest forms of the
device are the common law class action and the 1848 Field Code class action. Although
these forms have declined in importance in recent years, they are still employed in a
significant minority of the states. Id. at 425- 63. Of more recent vintage are class actions
patterned on the 1938 version of Federal Rule 23. Michigan is one of the states using some
variant of this form. Id. at 463-91. The fourth type is the revised Federal Rule 23 class
action. This form was developed for use in the Federal courts in 1966 and has been
adopted in a number of states. Id. at 491-96.
Despite the somewhat different backgrounds of the present federal rule and Michigan
Rule 208, practice under both rules tends to be fairly uniform.
34 In a class action, a few individuals may represent vast groups of people. The class in
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) was thought to include about
3,750,000 purchasers of odd lot securities.
35 Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L.
REV. 515, 520 (1969).
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significant authority to assure the fair and full conduct of the
action.3 6 In part, subdivision (d) of the Federal Rule permits
broad measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the
presentation of argument and authorizes the imposition of condi-
tions on representative parties or interveners. Such provisions are
not only necessary to allow the courts to protect the interests of
class members but create a flexibility in management which allows
judicial control of suits involving vast numbers of plaintiffs.3 7
Despite these advantages, the class suit as a practical solution
to the potential multiplicity problem of the Environmental Protec-
tion Act is in many respects little better than compulsory joinder.
Even with the administrative flexibility available in class suits, it
is still possible that sheer numbers might overwhelm the litigation
and prevent the court from protecting the rights of individual
parties or from reaching the merits of the action at all. Moreover,
the courts will often require those originally bringing a class
action to seek out additional named plaintiffs to represent certain
interests within the state.38 Although class actions are more
efficient than joinder in dealing with tremendously large numbers
of possible plaintiffs, they are nevertheless immensely com-
plicated proceedings often resulting in substantial waste of judicial
time and the litigant's resources.39 Additional financial problems
for potential plaintiffs are generated by due process requirements
of notice to interested parties; if class members are to be bound
by a judgment, they must receive notice of the pendency and
significant developments of a class action.40 The courts are di-
vided on the question of who is responsible for bearing the cost of
36 See Newberg, Orders in the Conduct of Class Actions: A Consideration of Subdivi-
sion (d), 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 577 (1969).
37 Id.
38 See 3 B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.73 (2d ed. 1969). In addition to improving
conditions relating to class definition, it is common for the courts to require the strength-
ening of class representation before a suit may proceed on a class basis; see Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, Note of 1966 to Rule 23(c)(1), reprinted at 3B J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.01 [1I] (2d ed. 1969). Such action is often required because of
the constitutionally imposed condition that persons must be adequately represented by
someone sharing their interests before they can be bound by a class suit; Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Because of the diversity of those entitled to sue under the
Environmental Protection Act (the group ranges from individuals to corporations to
government agencies) strengthening of representation should often be required in suits
brought under the Act.
39 On some of the administrative problems involved in class actions, see Weithers, supra
note 35, at 522-24. In Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 801 (1963), an admittedly complicated case, various adminis-
trative problems required three years to resolve.4 0 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See also Ward
& Elliott, The Contents and Mechanics of Rule 23 Notice, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV.
557, .559-60 (1969); Comment, Constitutional and Statutory Requirements of Notice
UnderRule 23(c)(2), 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 571 (1969).
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notice, but most often it has been held that the representative
plaintiffs are responsible for this cost.41 Plaintiffs, precluded from
seeking damages under the Environmental Protection Act,42
might well find the costs of initiating a class action prohibitive.43
Apart from these practical difficulties, there remains the prob-
lem of whether the courts may force plaintiffs to utilize the class
device. There is little authority allowing a court to compel litiga-
tion as a class rather than as an individual. To be sure, a court
could apply pressure toward this end by requiring joinder of
excessively large numbers of persons; but forcing the plaintiff to
choose between Scylla and Charybdis does little to alleviate the
substantive problems of either joinder or class actions. Whether a
court could order a plaintiff to convert an individual suit into a
class suit is very doubtful. Neither Federal Rule 23 nor Michigan
Rule 208 provides for compulsory class suits. Although Professor
Moore argues that it is permissible for a court, at least under
present Federal Rule 23, to order a suit transformed into a class
action, 44 he does not cite any cases in which this power has been
exercised.4 5 Certainly if Professor Moore had been discussing the
old version of Rule 23, his position would have been wrong, for at
least two cases hold to the contrary. 46 The history and policy of
the present rule suggest that its drafters had no intention of
overturning these cases; during the drafting of the rule, a proposal
41 Compare Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir, 1968) (plaintiff must
pay notice) and Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (action dis-
missed on plaintiffs refusal to pay notice), with Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472
(E.D.N.Y. 1968) (indicating that cost of notice may be assumed by court). If notice by
personal service were required, though it may not be in cases under the Environmental
Protection Act, the cost would be staggering and, for all practical purposes, would spell the
immediate end of the litigation. Despite the cautious language on the point found in I J.
HONIGMAN & C. HAWKINS, supra note 16, R. 208, the notice provision of Michigan's
class action rule appears to make it a simple matter for the courts to permit notice by
publication in appropriate cases. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Even if the notice
device is publication, the costs would certainly be substantial.
MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §691.1203 (Supp. 1971), which provides for the apportion-
ment of costs, might open the way to shifting the costs of notice to the defendant in cases
won by the plaintiffs. This does not, however, help either plaintiffs unwilling to gamble on
the possibility of reimbursement if the suit is successful (notice costs have to be expended
early in the litigation), or plaintiffs who fail to prevail on the merits.
4 The Act does not make provision for damage claims. It might be possible, however, to
join an Environmental Protection Act case with a tort action seeking damage relief.
43 In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), the cost of providing
personal notice to 3,750,000 class members was estimated at $400,000. Consider the
possible costs if the class were eight million persons, or two hundred million.
43B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.02-2 n. 38 (2d ed. 1969).
45 Professor Moore's only case, Richmond v. Irons. 121 U.S. 27 (1887), involves
creditors' bills and the statement on which he seems to rely is merely dicta and only
supports his position by implication.
4Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 127 F.2d. 245, 251 (7th
Cir. 1942); Matlaw Corp. v. War Damage Corp., 7 F.R.D. 349, arfd. 164 F.2d 281 (7th
Cir. 1947).
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allowing a court upon its own initiative to convert an individual
action into a class suit against plaintiff's wishes was dropped from
the final revision.47 The implication of this history is supported by
the central policy embodied in the rule, which according to Pro-
fessor Kaplan is to safeguard the interests of "the smaller guy." 48
To achieve this goal, the rule provides for collective redress of
wrongs which, although involving only small claims by each in-
dividual, affect a great number of people. 49 It is difficult to infer
from this purpose the authority to force compulsory class actions
on small and unwilling litigants at the request of corporate defen-
dants in order to protect such defendants from multiple suits.
While there is no Michigan authority on the compulsory use of
class actions, it is likely that the Michigan courts would follow the
interpretation of old Federal Rule 23, on which the Michigan rule
is based.
At a different level of analysis, it does seem clear that the
courts can require the plaintiff, who on his own initiative seeks to
litigate on a class basis, to define his class to include all potential
plaintiffs under the Environmental Protection Act. Federal Rule
23(d)(3) permits the "imposition of conditions" on representative
parties. Section 208.4 of the Michigan rule appears to contain
analogous authority. Quite frequently, these rules have been used
to require redefinition of classes as a prerequisite to continuing an
action on a class basis.50 Although such redefinition typically is
designed to reduce a class to a more coherent or manageable
size, 51 the power to impose conditions seems to provide an equal-
47 Newberg, supra note 36, at 600.
48 Quoted in Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 501, 504. Professor Kaplan was Reporter for the Advisory Com-
mittee on Civil Rules when it drafted the 1966 revision of Rule 23. See also Kaplan,
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 375-400 (1967). Certainly the recent use of class
actions justifies this sweeping view. The device has frequently been employed on behalf of
welfare recipients, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); consumers, see cases cited in
Starts, The Consumer Class Action-Part 11: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U.L.
REV. 407 n.9; and tenants, e.g., Gatreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority. 265 F. Supp.
582 (N.D. 111. 1967). it has been widely used to challenge both racial discrimination, e.g.,
Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 42 F.R.D. 617 (D. Conn. 1967),
rev'd, 395 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1968); Congress of Racial Equality v. Comm'r, Social
Security Adm., 270 F. Supp. 537 (D. Md. 1967); Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A., 273 F. Supp. 502
(E.D.N.C. 1967); and malapportionment of government bodies, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962). Its uses have also extended to such disparate groups as civil rights
workers, e.g., Chafee v. Johnson, 229 F. Supp. 445 (S.D. Miss. 1967); contract home
buyers, e.g., Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. I11.
1969); and Selective Service registrants, e.g., Gregory v. Hershey, 311 F. Supp. I (E.D.
Mich. 1969).
49 See Ford, supra note 48, at 502.
50 See note 38 supra.
51 Thus in Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D.
Pa. 1968), the complainant was required to pare down a vaguely drawn class of about
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ly appropriate device in which to require expansion of a proposed
class. However, since the power to require class redefinition
initially depends upon the plaintiffs decision to bring a class
action it is doubtful whether this power will significantly curtail
the multiplicity problem. Not many Environmental Protection Act
plaintiffs are likely to make this decision. Because of the adminis-
trative problems which they create, class actions are generally
useful in only two situations: when damages are sought and the
class device can be used to aggregate a number of smaller claims
which might not have been economically maintained as separate
actions; 52 and when injunctive relief is needed on behalf of a
group of similarly situated individuals and an injunction, if obtain-
ed by a single member of the group, will benefit only that member
and not the other members of the group. 53 Actions under the
Environmental Protection Act do not fall into either of these
categories; damages cannot be awarded under the Act, and in-
junctive relief is as adequate when obtained through an individual
action as through a class suit. Thus, it is difficult to see why
environmental plaintiffs, particularly when faced with having to
litigate for everyone in the state, would choose to bring a class
action. Moreover the sanction available to enforce a condition
imposed under Rule 23(d)(3)-denial of an opportunity to litigate
on a class basis-is obviously not effective in a situation where
the court is seeking to compel people to litigate on a class basis. 54
Finally, at least under the Federal Rule, individuals within the
eighteen thousand homebuilders to a more limited class including only those homebuilders
operating within the district in which the action was filed.
52 See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (damages sought
on behalf of class of securities purchasers with individual claims as small as seventy
dollars).
5 The college desegregation cases are typical of this situation. If one member of the
group seeking admission sues separately on his own behalf and is successful in obtaining
injunctive relief, he alone, and not other members of the group, will benefit from the
injunction. But, where an injunction is obtained in a class suit on behalf of the entire group,
the injunction can be used by each member of the class to obtain individual relief (i.e., his
or her admission to the defendant college). See, e.g., Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235
(N.D. Ala.), affd, 228 F.2d 619 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939 (1955). See also
Gregory v. Tarr, 311 F. Supp. I (E.D. Mich. 1969) (relief on behalf of a class of selective
service registrants). By contrast, in the so-called "single issue" situation, adequate relief
can be obtained on behalf of a group either by a class suit or by an action by one aggrieved
individual alone. For example, suppose a group is seeking to halt the dumping of untreated
wastes into a river. If one member of the group, suing alone, obtains injunctive relief, all
members of the group will benefit by the resulting halt in the dumping of the wastes. No
more effective benefits for the group can be obtained if they sue as a class. The only
possible advantage of class injunctive relief here is that it provides a larger group of
individuals who may subsequently enforce an injunction through contempt proceedings.
See Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U.L.
REV. 407, 413-15 (1969).54 See 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.73 (2d ed. 1969).
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defined class are permitted to opt out of the class if they so desire,
removing themselves from the litigation entirely. 55 Thus, without
a change in the underlying theory and practical administration of
class action rules, the device cannot be counted on to bring all
possible plaintiffs under the Environmental Protection Act into
the same courtroom, and, even if it could, the problems created by
using the device might well outweigh the benefits of avoiding
multiple suits.
4. Collateral Estoppel
Under a theory of collateral estoppel, the decision of the first
suit directed at an alleged act of environmental disruption would
be binding on all possible plaintiffs under the Act without actually
bringing all these persons into the first suit as parties.56 Before
collateral estoppel may be asserted, however, certain limitations
on the application of the doctrine must be overcome.
One prerequisite is that the issues which are sought to be given
conclusive effect must have been fully litigated.5 7 The purpose of
this requirement is reasonably clear. A party may not consider it
worth his time and expense to raise and argue every possible issue
involved in a case, and his failure to do so should not prevent him
from subsequently raising that issue should it be relevant to some
new cause of action.
Not only must all issues for which collateral estoppel is sought
be fully litigated, but the issues must have been necessary to the
outcome of the litigation. 58 Conclusive effect should only be given
55 Id. 23.55.
56 As traditionally defined, the collateral estoppel doctrine provides that an individual or
persons with whom he is in privity will be estopped from asserting a matter of fact if that
matter has been previously determined against the individual or his privies in some other
suit (at least so long as the matter was essential to the judgment in the former litigation).
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1877); see generally Developments in the
Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 840-50 (1952); Polasky, Collateral Estop-
pet-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IOWA L. REV. 217 (1954); Scott, Collateral Estoppel
by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1942); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 et seq.
(1942). Collateral estoppel differs from res judicata in that the latter doctrine is only
conclusive within the confines of a single cause of action.. The purpose of both doctrines,
however, is identical: litigation of an issue should come to an end once litigants have had
their day in court. See, e.g., Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191 (1932); United Shoe Machinery
Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).5 7 E.g., Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1877); Bloch v. Mill Factors Corp.,
119 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1941).
58 Detroit Trust Co. v. Furbeck, 324 Mich. 401, 37 N.w.2d 151 (1949); The Evergreens
v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944); United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. McCarthy, 33 F.2d 7 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 590
(1929). One should also note that full litigation has also generally been interpreted to
preclude collateral estoppel effect for default judgment and consent decrees. Fruehauf
Trailer Co. v. Gilmore, 167 F.2d 324 (10th Cir. 1948); Cutler v. Arlington Casket Co.,
255 Mass. 52, 151 N.E. 167 (1926).
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to "ultimate" facts not "mediate" or "evidentiary" facts. 59 Both
the "full litigation" and "necessary to judgment" requirements
increase the attractiveness of collateral estoppel as a solution to
the multiplicity problem. Because they limit the binding effect of a
prior judgment which is being asserted as conclusive in a later
suit, they could be employed by the judiciary to assure that the
use of a first Environmental Protection Act suit to collaterally
estop later suits did not foreclose important environmental issues
which had never actually been litigated. On the other hand, estop-
pel provides some assurance that defendants will not be subject to
harassing litigation and that the courts will not be forced to
expend time on issues previously adjudicated.
Mutuality of estoppel, where a litigant could not invoke the
conclusive effect of a judgment unless he would have been bound
had the judgment gone the other way, was at one time a general
requirement for collateral estoppel.60 However, a number of re-
cent cases have discarded the mutuality requirement on the theo-
ry that where there is an identity of issues in two suits, a party
against whom judgment has been rendered in one suit is con-
sequently bound in subsequent suits regardless of the identity of
his adversaries. 61 The most notable examples of the breakdown of
the mutuality doctrine have been in the area of multiple party
disasters, particularly airplane crashes.62
The use of collateral estoppel to resolve the problem of mul-
59 This issue was raised in Judge Learned Hand's opinion in The Evergreens v. Nunan,
141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944). The Board of Tax Appeals had determined the defendant's
basis as to certain "fully improved" lots. In a subsequent action to determine the basis for
certain "partially improved" lots in the same area, the taxpayer argued that collateral
estoppel required that the basis of the partially improved property must be found by
subtracting from the basis of the fully improved lots the amount which the Board has found
that the taxpayer spent to improve his "improved lots." The court held that in determining
the value of the improved lots it was not necessary, though it may have been helpful, to
determine the amount that the taxpayer spent improving the lots. The amount spent on
improving the lots was thus only a mediate or evidentiary fact in the Tax Board hearing.
As a mediate fact, the determination of this amount was not binding in the subsequent
litigation.
60 See, e.g., Ralph Wolff& Sons v. New Zealand Ins. Co., 248 Ky. 304, 58 S.W.2d 623
(1933); First Nat'l Bank v. Barkshire Life Ins. Co., 176 Ohio St. 395, 199 N.E.2d 863
(1964).
61 See Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Israel v.
Wood Dolson Co., I N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956); B. R. DeWitt,
Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967); DePolo v. Greig,
338 Mich. 703, 62 N.W.2d 441 (1954). The accepted rule prior to Bernhard was that since
a nonparty would not be bound by a judgment, notions of mutuality prevented the use of
that judgment against a party by one not bound. Justice Traynor in Bernhard stated that as
long as the party had the opportunity-to fully litigate the issues in the first trial, there was
no reason not to bind him to that determination. However, Traynor reaffirmed the view
that it would be a violation of due process to bind a nonparty to a judgment. 19 Cal.2d, at
811, 112 P.2d at 894.
62 Those courts which have abolished the mutuality requirement have applied a reason-
ableness standard to assertions of collateral estoppel by nonparties. Two of the airplane
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tiple suits faces the more troublesome consideration of whether
non-parties to an Environmental Protection Act suit are in privity
or otherwise sufficiently connected to the party-plaintiffs who
brought the case. If this connection between the plaintiffs is
established, then collateral estoppel would apply to all decided
issues. It is quite possible, however, that such a broad determina-
tion of privity would evoke significant problems of due process.
Typically, collateral estoppel is used to give conclusive effect to
determinations made in one suit when a party to that suit sub-
sequently attempts to re-litigate these determinations in another
suit. Moreover, it is generally assumed that binding non-parties to
a former adjudication is a denial of due process because it de-
prives them of their opportunity for a day in court.63 Although it
is clear that a non-party may be bound by the outcome of an
action if he is in privity with a party to the action,64 it is ex-
ceedingly unclear whether successive plaintiffs in suits brought
under the Act can be said to be in privity under traditional privity
notions. Privity is generally found (1) where there is a common
interest in property either through a concurrent or successive
relationship in the same property,65 and (2) where there is sub-
stantial identity between two or more persons. 66 Potential
cases serve as useful examples. In United States v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp.
709 (E.D. Wash. 1962), affd sub nom. United Airlines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964), seven claimants brought suit in Washington and
Nevada federal courts seeking to invoke a California judgment as collateral estoppel
against United Airlines for damages resulting from an airplane crash. The initial action in
California was brought by twenty-four plaintiffs who extensively litigated the issues over a
period of fourteen weeks. The airline lost, appealed, and the judgment was affirmed.
Considering these factors, plus the fact that the seven claimants did not live in California
and were under no duty to intervene, the court ruled that the California judgment could be
used as collateral estoppel against the airline.
A different conclusion was reached in Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines,
Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966). A wrongful death
action -arose in California federal court as a result of an airplane crash which resulted in the
death of all the passengers. The jury returned a verdict for the airline, but the judge
granted a new trial. After the second trial, the jury returned a verdict for $35,000 in
contrast to the $500,000 which was sought. BCPA did not appeal. Berner, the plaintiff in a
separate but parallel action pending in federal court in New York, then asserted that the
California judgment should be determinative against the airline in his case. Judge Moore,
writing for a unanimous court, noted that since the first judgment had been relatively small,
the airline might not have exerted the same energies in defending itself as it would in
Berner's case-an inference supported by the airline's decision not to appeal. He therefore
ruled that collateral estoppel should not be invoked by a plaintiff who was not a party to
the first action when to do so would work substantial injustice upon the defendant. The
court distinguished the United Airlines case in which the first action involved twenty-four
of the thirty-one claimants and the issues were fully litigated and appealed.
63 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807,
811, 122 P.2d 892, 894 (1942) (dictum).
64See, e.g., Southern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1 (1897).
5 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 83, comment a (1942).
66 See I B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.411[3] (2d ed. 1965).
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plaintiffs under the Environmental Protection Act do not seem to
fall into either of these categories.
They do not have a traditional common interest in particular
pieces of property; rather, they have an interest, recognized by
statute, common to all members of the public in the natural
resources of the state. Thus while there is a similarity of interest,
there is not-because of the diversity of the citizenry-a common
interest or a "substantial identity" in the sense of the conventional
law of property. Even though there is no conventional common
interest, all potential plaintiffs under the Act sue as members of
the general public and not simply on their own behalf. In this
sense, it might be said that any two plaintiffs under the Act
represent the same interest and share "substantial identity." 67 The
problem, however, is that the Environmental Protection Act does
not embody the idea of a monolithic "public interest" which must
necessarily be represented once and for all by a single attorney
general, whether public or private. It contemplates that the public
interest may incorporate a variety of interests and views that have
not traditionally had their day in court; and it leaves open the
opportunity for representation of a plurality of interests, different
though none the less each legitimate, in litigation under the Act.
Even assuming that it would be possible to develop a new
privity rule to bind environmental plaintiffs-for example, such a
rule might deem plaintiffs under the Act to be in privity because
of their analogous rights to sue in the public interest as private
attorneys general-due process requirements might preclude such
innovation. The Supreme Court in Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v.
Newport68 has suggested that due process requires privity to be
narrowly construed. In that opinion, the Court stated that "[t]he
67The concept of "substantial identity" is illustrated by Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. v.
Schendel, 270 U.S. 611 (1926). In this case, a decedent's administrator who was suing the
decedent's former employer, solely on behalf of B (a relative of the decedent), under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, was held collaterally estopped as to an issue decided in
a prior case between B and the employer under the Iowa Employers' Liability Act. The
administrator was estopped because he was representing the same interest in the FELA
suit, B's, which B himself had represented in the prior suit.
68 247 U.S. 464 (1918). The constitutional difficulties which arise in attempting to extend
privity were illustrated in this case. The City of Newport had sold a license for the
construction of telegraph poles and lines to a New York firm. The firm subsequently resold
its rights to a Kentucky corporation. Neither firm paid the contract price allegedly owed
the city for the license. Therefore, sometime after the first sale, Newport sued the New
York firm and succeeded in obtaining a judgment. Newport subsequently attempted to
recover judgment from the Kentucky corporation on the theory that the corporation was
bound by res judicata by the earlier suit against the New York firm. This clearly would
have been a proper assertion of right if the judgment in the suit against the New York firm
had been entered before sale of its rights to the Kentucky firm. If the judgment had
preceded the sale, the subsequent pruchasers, as successors to the New York firm's rights
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opportunity to be heard is an essential requirement of due process
of law in judicial proceedings. " 69 This opportunity is denied
where actual privity is lacking.
Besides the opportunity to be heard, due process requires that
proper notice be given. Conceivable safeguards could be built
into suits brought under the Act which would assure adequate
notice, a fair opportunity to appear, and constitutionally sufficient
representation which might avoid the constitutional difficulties of
expanded notions of privity. The trouble with this remedy is that
it gives environmental suits a quasi-class aspect with the panoply
of problems (e.g., high costs and complicated administration) as-
sociated with class actions.
D. Towards an "Innovative" Solution
The fundamental difficulty with attempts to solve the problem
of multiple suits through the doctrines of joinder, class action and
collateral estoppel is that these devices try to use the first suit
directed at a particular act of alleged pollution as a vehicle to
avoid multiple litigations. By trying to bring everyone together in
the same courtroom, joinder and class actions (to the extent that
they work at all) would probably burden environmental protection
litigation with costs far out of proportion to the multiplicity prob-
lem. The safeguards necessary to avoid the constitutional
and liabilities, would have been bound by the judgment. That is, they would have been
treated as in privity with the New York firm. But because the judgment followed the sale,
the Kentucky firm did not succeed to the judgment liability. It was not in privity as to the
judgment. Nevertheless, the city argued, and the Kentucky courts accepted the view, that
privity between the New York and Kentucky firms did exist. 160 Ky. 244, 169 S.W. 700
(1914). The U.S. Supreme Court in reversing the Kentucky decision, found that the two
firms were not in privity, and stated:
The doctrine of resjudicata rests at bottom upon the ground that the party to
be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated or had an
opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action in a court of
competent jurisdiction. The opportunity to be heard is an essential require-
ment of due process of law in judicial proceedings .... And a state may not,
consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, enforce a judgment against a
party named in the proceedings without a hearing or an opportunity to be
heard .... so it cannot, without disregarding the requirement of due process
give a conclusive effect to a prior judgment against one who is neither a party
nor in privity with a party therein. 247 U.S. at 476.
The clear implication of this statement is that the Kentucky courts exceeded constitutional
bounds in attempting to expand privity as they did. While the Supreme Court has appar-
ently not addressed this exact same question since Postal Telegraph, there is no doubt that
the principle for which it stands is still good law. And, indeed, this assertion can be
supported by implications in a number of cases, most recently Justice Harlan's opinion in
Provident Tradesmens' Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 110 (1968). See
also NLRB v. Lannom Mfg. Co., 226 F.2d 194, 199 (1955); Newberry Library v. Board
of Education of Chicago, 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944); Hedlund v. Miner, 395 Il1.
217, 69 N.E.2d 862 (1946).
69 247 U.S. at 476.
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difficulties of binding non-parties with collateral estoppel have
much the same effect.
This suggests that perhaps the better approach to the problem
of multiple suits is to deal with it when it arises, not before. Thus,
litigation arising under the Environmental Protection Act need not
be burdened with safeguards against future suits based on identi-
cal claims, especially when such suits are little more than a
remote contingency. Instead of telling the successive claimants
that their rights have been determined in a previous action, a
better solution is to allow a defendant faced with yet another
identical suit to seek de novo judicial protection against further
litigation (so long, at least, as the subsequent litigation raises no
new issues). Although no device in modern procedural codes is
suitable for this task, it may be possible to construct a new device
to deal with multiple suits out of an old and virtually forgotten
equitable tool, the bill of peace.
1. Origins of Bills of Peace
Bills of peace originally evolved in the English chancery courts
in the mid-17th century because of difficulties encountered in
attempting to join a multitude of individuals with similar interests
in a single action.70 Bills of peace became a general means of
confining litigation of multiple claims in two situations: first,
where a large number of persons were suing or threatening to sue
a defendant or group of defendants in a series of parallel suits
involving common issues; second, where further litigation was
threatened after a right had been determined in one or more
previous actions. 71 In the former case, equity would order a halt
70 Persons who were not joint obligees or jointly liable could generally not be united on
one side of a case either by writ or by court action. Z. CHAFEE, CASES ON EQUITABLE
REMEDIES 107 (enlarged ed. 1939). The first exception to this procedural tendency was
expressed in How v. Tenants of Bromgrove, 23 Eng. Rep. 277 (Chancery 1681). The
case involved a controversy between a lord and his tenants over rights of common. Taking
jurisdiction in equity of a bill filed by the lord to determine his rights against the tenants
collectively, Nottingham observed that the issue would normally be triable in actions at
law, but that equity might hear the controversy in a single package to prevent a multiplicity
of suits. The issues in the cases being legal, equity could not have heard it but for the
multiplicity feature.
71 These two categories were defined by Justice Field in Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U.S.
533, 541-42 (1891). See also Boston & M.R.R. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 242 App.
Div. 714, 273 N.Y.S. 670 (1934) (dissenting opinion). See generally Chafee, Bills of Peace
With Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1932). This article is reprinted, with
additional annotation, in Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 149-98 (1950). The
flexibility, as well as the good sense, with which equity used bills of peace is illustrated by
the decision in Mayor of York v. Pilkington, I Atk. 282 (Chancery 1737). The case arose
out of a dispute between the City of York and a group of lords of manors and other
land-holders over fishing rights in a section of the River Ouse. The city asserted that, by
virtue of an ancient prescription, it had sole rights in the tract of river. Collectively the
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to the further prosecution of separate litigation and would bring
the whole controversy together in a single action to determine the
respective rights and duties of the parties.7 2 In the latter, equity
would simply halt all further litigation of the issues previously
decided. 73
2. Characteristics of Bills of Peace
The question whether some variation of the bill of peace can be
as effective in dealing with the multiplicity of suits under the
Environmental Protection Act requires consideration of the char-
acteristics of bills of peace7 4 and possible difficulties which may
arise from their use.75 Two characteristics are couched in terms of
prerequisites to the use of bills of peace: first, the multiplicity of
suits against which the bill is sought must contain some common
element;7 6 second, the person seeking the bill must possess an
existing cause of action or right of relief against future litigants. 77
As Pomeroy expresses it, a bill of peace will not issue unless the
members of the multitude disputed whether there was indeed such a prescription. In-
dividually each also asserted a separate and distinct right to fish based on his riparian
proprietorship. In substance, then, the issues in the case broke up into, first, a common
question of whether York had any right of fishery at all and, second, separate questions of
whether, even if the city did have such a right, individual members of the multitude had
superior rights. This was obviously a far more complex problem than that in How v.
Tenants of Bromgrove where the issues between each member of the multitude and their
lord were identical. Yet, despite the distinct claims of the various landholders, the chan-
cellor sustained a bill of peace filed by the city. The chancellor's theory was this: only if
the city won on the common question would it be necessary to hear each of the separate
defenses. Permitting a bill would thus not only save repeated hearings in separate suits on
the common issue, but it might also collectively determine whether there was any need to
reach the defenses. This advantage, the chancellor apparently felt, was sufficient to incur
the disadvantages of hearing the divergent claims of the multitude in a single proceeding
should the city prevail on the common issue.
72 H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 181 (2d ed. 1948). A collection of typical
cases is found in Z. CHAFEE, CASES ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES 108 n.4 (enlarged ed.
1939). Sometimes the technique used to make a determination of collective rights was to
try one of the multitude of suits and then to apportion relief to the other parties on the
basis of the result in the test case. See Comment, Procedural Devices for Simplifying
Litigation Stemming from Mass Tort Cases, 63 YALE L. J. 493, 502 n.60 (1954).
73 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 247 (5th ed. 1941). See also Marsh v. Reed,
10 Ohio 347, 350 (1842) and the cases cited at 2 AMES, CASES IN EQUITY JURISDICTION
96 n.2 (1904). Repeated actions in ejectment were possible because of the common law
rule that the judgment in one action of ejectment was not conclusive in a subsequent action
even between the same parties. H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 192, at 520
(2d ed. 1948). Today, statutes regulating ejectment and modem actions for the recovery of
real property make one successful verdict conclusive against later suits on the same claim.
Z. CHAFEE, CASES ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES 205 (enlarged ed. 1939).
74 A word of caution may be appropriate here. In attempting to define bills of peace,
McClintock points out that: "The term 'bill of peace,' like all terms referring to forms of
equitable relief, is descriptive, not technical, so that no precise statement of its scope is
possible." PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 176, at 480-81 (2d ed. 1948).
75 An extensive discussion of the traditional uses of bills of peace is at I J. POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 243- 75 (5th ed. 1941).
76 First State Bank v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 63 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1933).
77 See I J. POMEROY, supra note 75, at § 250, and cases cited therein.
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suits at which it is directed have "some common relation, some
common interest, or some common question.- 78 Although it is
clear that a complete identity of issues between the pending suits
is not necessary, 79 some commonality is required. This require-
ment stems from the fact that the function of a bill of peace is to
produce economies in the judicial system by reducing repetitive
litigation.
The first prerequisite poses no problems for the use of bills of
peace in environmental cases. As stressed earlier,80 all possible
plaintiffs under the Act stand in exactly the same respect to any
potential defendant. Issues of the impact of defendant's conduct
on the particular plaintiff bringing a suit will not be relevant in
suits brought pursuant to the Environmental Protection Act. The
only relevant issues in such actions will be the impact of the
defendant's conduct on the public generally, and any two suits
directed at the same defendant over the same alleged pollution
will pose identical questions in all respects. Thus the only restric-
tion imposed by the first prerequisite would be to preclude a
potential defendant under the Environmental Protection Act from
resorting to bills of peace until he had actually been subjected to a
multiplicity of suits. The rationale for this restriction becomes
quite clear when considered in the context of the Environmental
Protection Act. If a defendant, immediately after litigating a single
suit, could freely obtain a bill of peace to preclude the possibility
of suits at some future time, however remote, 81 the underlying
purposes of the Act might be easily frustrated.
78 1d. § 251.
7 See discussion of Mayor of York v. Pilkington, supra note 7 1.
80 See note 26 supra.
81 One problem relating to the first prerequisite remains, however. It has sometimes been
said in cases, e.g., Tribette v. Illinois Central R.R., 70 Miss. 182, 12 So. 32 (1892), and in
commentaries, e.g., Comment, Procedural Devices for Simplifying Litigation Stemming
from a Mass Tort, 63 YALE L. J. 494, 504-06 (1954), that not only must there be common
issues in the multiplicity of suits against which a bill of peace is directed, at least when
these suits are at law, but there must also be a "community of interest" among members of
the multitude. By this, it is apparently meant that members of the multitude must share a
common title or common interest in subject matter. Potential litigants under the Environ-
mental Protection Act do not have a "community of interest," at least not a "community
of interest" in this sense. Though the claims of all plaintiffs under the Act come from a
common origin and have parallel issues, they cannot be said, for example, to share a
common interest in a res. It is unlikely, however, that this problem will be a serious matter
of concern in the context of the Act. For one thing, the test applied only where the
multiplicity of suits being attacked were at law. Suits under the Environmental Protection
Act are, of course, suits in what traditionally would have been equity. Besides, the
"community of interest" test, while it may have had some popularity in the last century,
was clearly not required under early cases like Mayor of York v. Pilkington, I Atk. 282
(Chancery 1737), and it has been rejected by more recent authority. Bailey v. Tillinghast,
99 F. 801, 807 (6th Cir. 1900). See also Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 176-77
(1950).
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The second prerequisite, that of an existing cause of action or
right of relief in the person seeking the bill,82 evolves, according
to Pomeroy, from the principle that "[t]he very object of pre-
venting a multiplicity of suits assumes that there are relations
between the parties out of which other litigations of some form
might arise." 83 A bill of peace, in other words, cannot be used to
create a cause of action where none at all existed before. In
typical cases, this requirement was usually satisfied because the
party seeking a bill and each member of the multitude against
whom the bill was sought had existing rights of action against the
other. For example, in How v. Tenants of Bromgrove 4 the lord
had a right of action at law against each of his tenants to restrict
their rights of common and, conversely, each tenant had a right of
action against the lord to enforce his rights of common. All that
the lord did in obtaining a bill of peace was to consolidate his
existing causes of action at law into a single suit in equity in order
to avoid having to sue each of the tenants separately. It is clear,
however, that the availability of the bill will not be absolutely
precluded by the fact that an individual seeking a bill of peace has
no existing and independent right against those to whom he seeks
to have the bill applied. A defendant in several nuisance actions,
for example, could not have originally sued the plaintiffs over the
matter. Still, beyond question, a bill of peace will issue against the
nuisance actions.8 5 The reason is that the filing of the multiple
suits apparently creates a new right of relief for the defendant. Or,
perhaps more precisely, the filing of the suits activates the defen-
dant's previously inchoate right to defend himself against the
suits. 86 The requirement of an existing cause of action as a pre-
requisite to the availability of bills of peace, then, is really only a
bar against the use of a bill by an individual who fears that at
some future time persons against whom he has no existing causes
of action may sue him.
It is just this restriction, however, which could impede the use
of bills of peace against environmental suits brought under the
Act. To be genuinely effective against the problem of consecutive
suits over identical issues being filed against a defendant, bills of
peace will have to be available against all possible plaintiffs under
the Act. The process of obtaining a bill of peace will involve
82 1 J. POMEROY, supra note 75.
93 Id. § 250, at 472-73.
84 23 Eng. Rep. 277 (Chancery 1681).
85 See Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 180-81 (1950).
86Storrs v. Pensacola & A.R.R., 29 Fla. 617, 11 So. 226 (1892); Turner v. City of
Mobile, 135 Ala. 73, 33 So. 132 (1902).
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some, perhaps substantial, relitigation of the issues raised in prior
cases. Thus obtaining bills of peace against only present plaintiffs
would not be markedly less expensive to a defendant than defend-
ing the suits brought by them on their merits. The use of bills of
peace as a cure for the multiplicity problem will make economic
sense only if they can be used to preclude more or less all future
suits on the same claim.
Since a potential environmental defendant has no cause of
action under the Act against potential plaintiffs, a bill should
theoretically issue only if a new cause is created in him by a
multiplicity of suits. Historically, a cause of action would arise
with multiplicity; however, the focus in all prior suits where bills
of peace were granted included only present parties to the dispute.
Yet under the Environmental Protection Act every consecutive
suit would necessarily involve a new plaintiff, and not a present
party (any single plaintiff would be barred by res judicata from
suing repeatedly on the same cause). The question thus becomes
whether a series of consecutive suits brought by separate parties
creates a cause of action in the defendant allowing him to sue for
a bill of peace against all possible plaintiffs. An affirmative answer
might be achieved through the kind of analysis used in the dis-
cussion of collateral estoppel to suggest that subsequent claimants
would not be asserting personal rights, but instead would, in
effect, be representing the public in vindicating a right held gener-
ally by the public. Since the prior suits were also brought by
claimants vindicating a public right, not a personal one, maybe
there does exist a multiplicity of suits between two "parties:" the
public and the defendant.
Although there is value in suggesting that a cause of action
does arise with environmental suits, it is probably more satisfac-
tory to examine whether a substantial portion of the existing
cause of action doctrine might be dispensed with in the situation
arising under the Act. Presumably, no constitutional difficulties
would be raised by easing the restriction. Clearly if a bill of peace
is going to be used to preclude someone from exercising the
power of suit given to him by the Environmental Protection Act,
it will have to do so within the context of constitutionally man-
dated procedural requirements. Adequate notice has to be given
and there probably has to be a fair opportunity to resist the bill. 8 7
Similarly, there might be some concern if the bill of peace device
were being used to preclude possible plaintiffs from availing them-
8 7 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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selves of a jury trial.88 The upshot is that a bill of peace may
require substantial expenditures; but these concerns have nothing
at all to do with whether a bill of peace ought to be available to a
defendant faced with the possibility of multiple suits in the ab-
sence of an existing right of relief.
Although the matter is not particularly well articulated by Pom-
eroy 89 or other equity treatise writers, it would appear that
nothing in the nature of bills of peace inherently requires the
existing cause of action requirement. Rather it is likely that the
requirement grew out of a variety of practical or public policy
concerns. One of these was surely a general reluctance among
judges and chancellors to multiply causes of action; the very
purpose of bills of peace was to make "one lawsuit grow where
two grew before." 90 It would have been exceedingly anamolous to
allow use of the device created for this purpose to promote new
litigation where there had been none before.
Yet the Michigan legislature in passing the Environmental Pro-
tection Act has at least intimated a very strong counter-policy for
allowing a bill of peace to issue despite the complainant's lack of
an existing right of relief where he previously has won suits
brought against him under the Act. The purpose of the Act is to
create a broad class of private attorneys general authorized to
bring suit to vindicate the general public interest in a non-polluted,
healthful environment. The Act does not give any individuals any
special rights, but only the general right to sue on behalf of the
public. Given these facts, there is no reason for everyone to have
an unfettered right to sue under the Act. Once a defendant has
been sued on identical claims, assuming the claims have been
adequately prosecuted, the function of the Act has been fulfilled.
The environmental merits of the defendant's conduct will have
been examined and ruled upon. If the defendant has managed to
prevail, the public's interest is not to be served by yet more
attacks on exactly the same conduct. Indeed, at this point, there
may be a greater public interest in avoiding court congestion
resulting from repetitive litigation.
The traditional policies underlying the existing cause of action
8 8 The Supreme Court in Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), expressed
just this concern: "[T]he availability of such equitable remedies as Bills of Peace, Quia
Timet and Injunction," the court suggested, should be used sparingly when they might
threaten the availability of a jury trial and particularly when the use of some other
procedural device might preserve this availability. 359 U.S. at 509- 10. This is not a
problem in the context of the Environmental Protection Act since actions under the Act
would be equitable in nature, and a jury trial would probably not be available in any
actions under the Act anyway. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 350-61 (1963).
8 See notes 77-78 supra, and accompanying text.
90 Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 149 (1950).
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requirement, on the other hand, lack force in the Environmental
Protection Act situation. Since there is a clearly definable group
of individuals eligible to sue under the Act, the practical problem
of identifying against whom the bill should issue dissolves entire-
ly. The fear that causes of action will be multiplied by allowing
persons without existing rights of action to seek bills of peace
against potential plaintiffs is groundless so long as availability of
bills of peace is limited to defendants who have been sued at least
once previously under the Act and are presently faced with a
second or third suit on the same claim. Moreover, imposition of
the prior suit condition on the availability of bills of peace min-
imizes the possibility that potential plaintiffs would be forced into
court on the defendant's terms. If, for example, a defendant can
only seek a bill of peace while a second, third or fourth suit is
pending against him, his ability to favorably time litigation will be
almost eliminated. To be sure, the availability of the bill will force
potential litigants who have not yet filed an action under the Act
to come into court when they might have preferred not to do so.
But if the public's interest has already been represented in several
prior cases on the same claim, it seems of little importance to
permit these potential plaintiffs to relitigate the public's interest
whenever they choose. In this context, the policies involved in the
multiplicity of suits problem favor relaxing the "existing cause of
action" prerequisite for bills of peace.
3. Bills of Peace Practice and Procedure
The procedural characteristics of bills of peace applicable to
the multiplicity problem will depend on several factors. Since the
paramount concern in issuance of a bill in an Environmental
Protection Act situation will be the protection of the public in-
terest, the traditional flexibility of chancery bills of peace should
be retained to enable a bill to conform to the particular needs of
the Act. However, issuance of a bill of peace against all eight
million potential plaintiffs may encounter constitutional difficulties
if individual rights of action were cut off without notice or hearing.
Furthermore, joinder of all possible plaintiffs in opposition to a
plea for a bill of peace, though theoretically possible, would be
practically unworkable because of the almost incomprehensible
procedural problems involved.
Since the use of the class device to sue defensive classes is well
known, the use of a class action to join all potential plaintiffs as
defendants does seem within the realm of possibility. 91 Although
91 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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issuance of a bill of peace against a defensive class of eight million
would pose some difficult administrative problems, these prob-
lems would be considerably less troublesome than those discussed
above in the use of class actions as a "single action" solution to
the multiplicity problem. 92 For example, an individual seeking a
bill of peace would clearly have an interest in suing against a
defensive class, and although notice costs and other charges
would be quite high, those seeking bills of peace may be better
able to pay these costs than Environmental Protection Act
plaintiffs are able to pay the high cost of class actions as a "single
action" solution. Furthermore, since the surcharge in the bill of
peace situation is placed not on one's right to litigate against
environmental disruption, but rather only on the availability of a
remedy for curbing the hardship of having to defend against
repeated environmental suits, the financial burden seems less
objectionable. Finally, whereas suits brought as class actions en-
tail possible problems of case management that might hinder
judicial efforts to reach the merits, in the bills of peace situation
the underlying environmental issues will have previously been
litigated and the court will be primarily concerned with less com-
plicated questions such as the content of previous litigation.
One possible problem of bills of peace against defensive classes
is that the party seeking the bills might be tempted to sue named
representatives of the class of potential plaintiffs who could not
adequately defend the class' interest. The court, however, can
avoid this problem simply by invoking its power to require a
strengthening of class representation9" by directing that the attor-
ney general, other interested government agencies and private
groups with a particular interest in the environmental problem at
stake be named as representative defendants in a class suit seek-
ing a bill of peace.
E. Conclusion
Because it is impossible to determine exactly how multiplicity
problems under the Environmental Protection Act will develop, it
is probably best that precise conditions for issuance of bills be
developed on a case by case basis. However, some general speci-
fications can nonetheless be suggested. As an initial matter, the
very right to seek bill of peace relief ought to be conditioned on
the happening of two events: first, the person seeking a bill of
peace should have been previously sued at least once on a par-
92 See notes 33-49 supra, and accompanying text.
93 See note 38 supra.
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ticular environmental claim under the Act; second, an identical
suit should be pending at the time the bill of peace is sought.
These requirements seem necessary to prevent abuses by persons
seeking bills of peace for reasons other than dealing with an actual
multiplicity of suits; for example, a company seeking a bill of
peace to quiet suits against smoke emissions from its factory at a
time when there was no real public concern over the emissions.
Furthermore, in entertaining a claim for a bill of peace, the
courts should attempt to accommodate all of the conflicting in-
terests involved in each case. They must determine whether relief
from a multiplicity of suits is really required to protect the
plaintiff's interests, and whether granting a bill might foreclose
future litigation of important environmental points which have
been inadequately or ineptly litigated in previous cases.
Traditional equity principles, such as denial of a bill's issuance
to a defendant with unclean hands, or a defendant who has slept
on his right to relief and to whom laches applies, are clearly
appropriate in the multiplicity context. 94 Going beyond this, how-
ever, the courts should formulate some specific standards to de-
termine whether all of the environmental issues in a claim against
which a bill of peace is sought have been fully and fairly exam-
ined. Relevant factors should include whether circumstances have
changed since previous litigation over the claim, whether all the
issues involved in the claim were fully litigated previously, which
issues were crucial to the decision in the previous litigation, who
were the plaintiffs, whether these plaintiffs were in a position to
adequately represent the general public interest, the type of relief
sought, whether the quality of the legal representation was ade-
quate, whether the previous cases were appealed, and to what
appellate level.
Analyzing these various standards will require that the courts
in bill of peace cases conduct fairly extensive trials involving not
only an examination of previous cases, but also some reconsidera-
tion of issues in order to provide some basis for determining
whether the previous litigation adequately covered the environ-
mental issues involved in the claim in question. The burden of
persuasion in these cases would, of course, lie on the person
seeking the bill of peace.
Having applied these standards, a court which has been asked
for bill of peace relief ought to issue an order accommodating the
interest of the defendant to that of the public interest. If, for
instance, only some of the issues involved in the claim in question
94 See notes 1 1- 13 supra, and accompanying text.
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have been fully litigated previously, the order ought to preclude
relitigation of only these issues. Similarly, if the particular con-
cerns of some special interest group- back packers, persons living
in proximity to the source of the alleged pollution, etc. - were not
represented in previous litigation, the order should allow future
litigation on behalf of these groups. Bill of peace relief should be
denied if the first litigation was collusive, if the plaintiffs presented
the case in a shockingly inadequate manner, or if the previous
plaintiffs' presentation of their case had been hampered by a lack
of funds. In some cases in which bill of peace relief is partially or
wholly denied on one of these or other grounds, the court might
still retain jurisdiction over the various parties and attempt to
litigate the underlying claim fully and properly on the merits.
Since the bill of peace claim will have necessarily brought all of
the interested parties before the court, the court might find that
the case presented the only real opportunity for complete litiga-
tion of this underlying claim; but this solution should not be used
if trial at the particular time would cause any plaintiffs undue
hardship. If the case were fully relitigated and Environmental
Protection Act relief denied, a bill of peace could then issue.
Finally, as an equitable decree, bills of peace would be modifiable
after their issuance on a showing of changed circumstances.*
* This note is a revised and edited version of a study prepared by David Everson, Dawn
Phillips, Phil Powers and John Trezise for a course in environmental law at the University
of Michigan Law School.
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION:
VAGUENESS AND DELEGATION OF POWERS
The Environmental Protection Act of 1970 allows private in-
dividuals to seek judicial protection of the state's substantial in-
terest in environmental quality. To accomplish this objective, the
Act establishes an obligation in both public agencies and private
citizens to prevent or minimize environmental damage. To en-
force that obligation, the Act also gives the courts significant
authority to shape the law of Michigan on environmental protec-
tion. The purpose of this note is to consider whether the provi-
sions of the Act placing a new burden on polluters and vesting
discretion in the courts transgress constitutional prohibitions on
grounds of vagueness, or as an improper delegation of authority.
A. VAGUENESS
The Act describes the obligations which it imposes in broad
terms. Persons shall not pollute or otherwise destroy the environ-
ment as long as there is a "feasible and prudent alternative."' If
there is no such alternative, the conduct may continue only if it is
consistent with the "public health, safety and welfare in light of
the state's paramount concern for the protection of its natural
resources. '"2 The Act does not explicitly define pollution. The fact
that the Act was drafted in broad, general terms raises a question
of vagueness: whether the legislature is constitutionally prohibited
from imposing duties couched in such expansive language on
private citizens. 3
1. A Bill in the Common-Law Mold
The sweeping language of the Act was consciously adopted by
'MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1203(1) (Supp. 1971).
2 Id.
3 The most frequently cited statement of the vagueness doctrine is found in Connally v.
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1927):
[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law.
However the test is phrased, the concern of the courts is that a person should be given fair
warning of the conduct required of him before a law can be enforced against him. Cf.
Burke v. Stephenson, 305 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957) (statute will be declared void if
it cannot be understood by persons upon whom it operates); People v. Detroit Edison Co..
16 Mich. App. 423, 168 N.W.2d 320 (1969) (due process is satisfied if defendant is fairly
and reasonably informed of the obligation cast upon him).
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the draftsmen.4 The Act was written with a view towards creating
a common-law right to a quality environment, a right inuring to
the people as members of the public.
The common-law approach is particularly appropriate to envi-
ronmental protection. Research is constantly revealing activities
to be dangerous which were once thought to be harmless. The
breadth of the bill assures that the courts will be open for private
citizens concerned about the quality of their environment to raise
such issues as evidence becomes available. Conversely, the exis-
tence of a specific definition is an invitation for the artful lawyer
to argue that it excludes his client. This fear was articulated by
the Texas Court of Appeals in Houston Compressed Steel v.
Texas:
The science of air pollution control is new and inexact, and
these standards are difficult to devise, but if they are to be
effective they must be broad. If they are too precise, they will
provide easy escape for those who wish to circumvent the
law. 5
An expansive, flexible standard is further necessitated by the
complexity of the pollution problem. Commentators have asserted
that specific regulations which do not take into consideration the
dynamic and changing quality of the evidence both with regard to
the effects of pollution and the techniques for control are in-
appropriate.6 Similar warnings against environmental measures
narrowly restricted in scope were expressed during recent Con-
4 It should be noted that the law tracks the MICH. CONST. art 4, § 52, which provides:
The conservation and development of the natural resources of the state are
hereby declared to be of paramount public concern in the interest of the
health, safety and general welfare of the people. The legislature shall provide
for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the state
from pollution impairment and destruction. (Emphasis added)
The relevant portion of the new Act provides:
When the plaintiff in the action has made a prima facie showing that the
conduct of the defendant has, or is likely to pollute, impair, or destroy the air,
water or other natural resources or the public trust therein, the defendant
may rebut the prima facie showing by the submission of evidence to the
contrary. The defendant may also show, by way of an affirmative defense,
that there is no feasible and prudent alternative to defendant's conduct and
that such conduct is consistent with the promotion of the public health, safety
and welfare in light of the state's paramount concern for the protection of its
natural resources from pollution, impairment or destruction. (Emphasis
added).
MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1203(l) (Supp. 1971).
5 456 S.W.2d 768 (1970). Air pollution was defined in the statute as
the presence in the atmosphere of one or more air contaminants or com-
binations thereof, in such concentration and of such duration as are or may
tend to be injurious to or to adversely affect human health or welfare ... as
to interfere with the normal use and enjoyment of... property.
6 See, e.g., Cassell, The Health Effects of Air Pollution and their Implications for
Control, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 197, 215 (1968).
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gressional hearings on techniques to more thoroughly assess the
impact of technology before its introduction into widespread use.
7
Nevertheless, to establish the propriety of the legislature's creat-
ing the framework for development of an environmental common
law is not to resolve the constitutional question of vagueness
resulting from the legislation's language.
2. Trend in the Courts
Courts have never required laws to define precisely the nature
of the burden they impose. A legislature can rarely anticipate
every fact situation to which a statute may be applied, nor articu-
late its intent in language so precise as to be incapable of different
interpretations. On the other hand, there is a judicial policy,
reinforced by the command of due process, to avoid the funda-
mental unfairness of a law so vague that one is unable to deter-
mine if his conduct is proscribed. Courts have harmonized these
two policies differently according to the interests affected by the
legislation. Although the basic standard remains constant, the
manner in which it is interpreted and the required certainty and
warning fluctuates depending on the court's -construction of the
statute, the nature of the subject matter restricted, and the sanc-
tion involved. Along with these factors is an overriding desire to
give effect to the legislative intent whenever possible.
When a person can lose his freedom for violating a law, courts
naturally examine it with a critical eye to assure that he could
know his act was illegal. The Supreme Court has stated that the
primary purpose of the "void for vagueness" doctrine is to pre-
vent the injustice of enforcing an overly vague criminal law.8 In
recent years the "void for vagueness" doctrine has been used to
strike down overly broad statutes which were used to restrict
freedom of speech and expression.9
7 Technology Assessment Seminar, Proceedings Before the Subcomm. on Science, Re-
search, and Development of the House Comm. on Science and Astronautics, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. passim (1967). The witnesses "stressed the vastness and intricacy of the prob-
lems to be investigated and warned against the dangers of. . . too narrowly focussed
measures." (Emphasis added). Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology A ssess-
ment, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 587, 590-91 (1969).
8 In Jordan v. DeGeorge, 241 U.S. 223, 230 (1951), the Court declared: "The essential
purpose of the void for vagueness doctrine is to warn individuals of the criminal con-
sequences of their conduct." State courts are in agreement that criminal statutes must be
construed narrowly, and that the unfairness of an overly broad criminal statute must be
avoided. See, e.g., People v. Consumers Power Co., 275 Mich. 86, 265 N.W. 785 (1936);
Otis v. Mattila, 281 Minn. 187, 160 N.W.2d 691 (1968); State v. Tatreau, 176 Neb. 381,
126 N.W.2d 157 (1964); Chadwick v. State, 201 Tenn. 57, 296 S.W.2d 857 (1956); Duffy
v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 366 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1963); State ex
rel. Ganon v. Krueger, 31 Wis.2d 609, 143 N.W.2d 437 (1966).
9 In Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), the Supreme Court reviewed the
conviction of a New York law banning papers "principally made up of... accounts ... or
Journal of Law Reform
The courts are in agreement that where criminal penalties and
limitations on personal freedoms are involved, the standard of
certainty is higher than when economic interests are regulated.
The prevailing judicial policy is to allow legislatures when regu-
lating economic interests to protect the public interest to pros-
cribe conduct in very broad terms. In Winters v. New York, 10 the
Court explained: "The standards of certainty in statutes punishing
for offenses is higher than in those depending primarily upon civil
sanction for enforcement." The Court stated further: "This Court
goes far to uphold state statutes that deal with offenses, difficult to
define, when they are not entwined with limitations on free ex-
pression."1 Justice Brennan, in Smith v. California,'2 went on to
explain why specificity is required of statutes affecting such fun-
damental rights: ."[S]tricter standards of permissible statutory
vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially in-
hibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at
his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the
loser."s3
Courts recognize that frequently statutes cannot be both spec-
ific and effective due to the nature of the activity being regulated
and the dissimilar fact situations to which the law would apply. In
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States,' 4 defendants chal-
lenged a penal regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission
which required all motor vehicles transporting explosives and
other dangerous substances to avoid, as far as practicable and
where feasible, driving through congested thoroughfares, tunnels,
viaducts, and other places where many people were likely to be.
The Court responded to the charge that the statute was uncon-
stitutionally vague by saying:
[F]ew words possess the precision of mathematical symbols,
most statutes must deal with untold and unforeseen vari-
pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime." The Court found the statute too
vague because it failed to distinguish clearly enough the "line between the allowable and
forbidden publications. No intent or purpose is required-no indecency or obscenity in any
sense heretofore known to the law." Id. at 519. See generally Note, The
Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
10 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
11 Id. at 515, 517. In a similar vein, the Idaho Supreme Court, finding a statute
unconstitutional which regulated the distribution of campaign literature, noted parent-
hetically that "although some limitation on speech is permissible, it cannot be accom-
plished by a somewhat vague statute even though the statute would be sufficiently definite
if, for example, it restricted an economic interest." State v. Barrey, 92 Idaho 581, 583, 448
P.2d 195, 197 (1968). See also The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine of the Supreme Court,
supra note 9.
12361 U.S. 147 (1959).
13 Id. at 151.
14342 U.S. 337 (1952).
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ations in factual situations, and the practical necessities of
discharging the business of government inevitably limit the
specificity with which legislators can spell out prohibitions.
Consequently no more than a reasonable degree of certainty
can be demanded. 15
The Michigan Supreme Court followed the same approach
when reviewing a statute allowing the Board of Registration to
revoke the medical license of doctors who engaged in advertising
of medical business in which grossly improbable statements were
made. The court rejected the vagueness argument on the ground
that "[iut would be quite impossible for the legislature to enumer-
ate all of the specific statements which might be grossly improb-
able." 16
In People v. Associated Oil Co., 17 the California Supreme
Court reviewed a statute in many respects similar to the Michigan
Environmental Protection Act: the Michigan Act proscribes "im-
pairment of the environment" where there are "feasible and pru-
dent alternatives"; the California provision prohibited "unreason-
able waste" of natural gas, and provided for equitable relief as a
remedy.' 8 The court, in upholding the statute under challenge for
vagueness, noted the necessity of the broad terminology: "be-
cause of the many and varying conditions peculiar to each reser-
voir and to each well ... it would be impossible for the legislature
to frame a [specific] measure . "..."19 (Emphasis added).
15 Id. at 340.
16 Warnshuis v. State Bd. of Reg. in Medicine, 285 Mich. 699, 281 N.W. 410 (1938).
This is part of the rationale for a large group of professional misconduct cases. See, e.g.,
State v. Durham, 191 A.2d 646 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1963); and Morrison v. State Bd. of
Education, 1 Cal.3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969), upholding a statute
allowing teachers to be removed for "moral turpitude and unprofessional conduct," and
cases cited therein.
17 211 Cal. 93, 294 P. 717 (1930).
18 The Oil and Gas Conservation Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 3300, 3312 (Deering
1954) provides
§ 3300: The unreasonable waste of natural gas by the act, omission,
sufferance, or instance of the lessor ... is opposed to the public interest and
is unlawful.
§ 3312: Wherever it appears to the director that the owners ... are causing
or permitting an unreasonable waste of gas, he may institute [suit] ... in the
name of the people ... to enjoin such unreasonable waste of gas ....
The law was a response to large releases of natural gas from oil wells which the legislature
wanted to limit after the discovery that the gas was a very valuable energy source.
19 211 Cal. at 108, 294 P. at 724. The court stated that
[clitation of authority is not necessary to support the statement that the
standard of reason has been applied in many cases where certainty is less
capable of measurement than in the present case, for instance, in statutes
prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade, the common-law rule of a rea-
sonable use of water by riparian owners, the rule of law regulating the duty of
care, etc. Id.
Other courts have spelled out in similar detail the different situations to which an act
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Perhaps the best known example of the judicial approval of
broadly drafted legislation is the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,2 0 which
was passed in response to a public outcry over the monopolistic
practices of the large trusts of the late 1800's. Prior to its enact-
ment, a body of law existed which prohibited restrictive arrange-
ments between competitors,21 but that approach was not sufficient
to protect the public interest. The legislative response was the
Sherman Act which (1) restated the rights and obligations of
private enterprise in the broadest terms (actions became unlawful
which amounted to a "restraint of trade"); (2) provided criminal
sanctions for violations; and (3) established a cause of action in
private citizens for equitable relief and treble damages. 22 The
Supreme Court did not find the broad language of the Act con-
stitutionally troublesome, but rather held it an appropriate re-
sponse to the problem. As Justice Hughes wrote in Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States:23
As a charter of freedom, the Act has a generality and adapt-
ability comparable to that found to be desirable in con-
stitutional provisions. It does not go into detailed definitions
which might either work injury to legitimate enterprise or
through particularization defeat its purposes by providing
loopholes for escape.
Of the standard established in the law, the Court said the Act's
"general phrases, interpreted to attain its fundamental objects, set
applied and the concomitant necessity for broad language. In Illinois Steel Co v. Fuller,
216 Ind. 180, 23 N.E.2d 259 (1939), the Indiana Supreme Court reviewed provisions of
the state Workmen's Compensation Act requiring that employers supply "serviceable gas
masks" and "sufficient means of ventilation" in workrooms in which there were "dan-
gerous, noxious, or deleterious gases." The court rejected the vagueness argument:
It may be observed that in the adoption of the ... statutes... the General
Assembly was undertaking to impose safety measures with respect to facto-
ries, establishments, and industries of many kinds. For example, masks that
would be serviceable and a means of ventilation that would be sufficient in a
gaseous mine might be wholly unsuited or inadequate in a factory where
poisonous chemicals or explosives were manufactured, or vice versa. It
would ... be impossible to prescribe by law definite specifications as to what
particular type of gas mask or what particular means of ventilation would be
serviceable and sufficient under all the varying circumstances to which the
acts are applicable ....
216 Ind. at 185, 23 N.E.2d at 262. Substitute "feasible and prudent alternative" for
"masks that would be serviceable and a means of ventilation that would be sufficient" and
the argument applies directly to the Michigan Environmental Protection Act.
See also Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941) (broad standards needed in relation
to national defense); Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
20 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
21 The common law forbade contracts, combinations and agreements creating or tending
to create a monopoly, or unreasonably suppressing or restraining trade. These laws,
however, proved to be ineffective because at most the court could declare the contract
void and unenforceable. A. NEALE, THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. (2d ed. 1970).
22 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
23288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
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up the essential standard of reasonableness. They call for vigil-
ance in the detection and frustration of all efforts unduly to
restrain the free course of interstate commerce ".... 24
Justice Hughes' opinion is germane to Michigan's Environmen-
tal Protection Act of 1970 in two important respects. First, it
accepts a statute which is phrased in expansive terms. Second, it
recognizes that the broad language of the Sherman Act adequately
describes a judicially enforceable standard. Indeed, the Environ-
mental Protection Act goes beyond the anti-trust law's statement
of the wrong, and describes the issues which are to be considered
and the factors which are to be weighed in determining the
propriety of the defendant's conduct. Thus, the Act asks whether
there are feasible and prudent alternatives to the pollution. If not,
the court must determine the public need for the defendant's
conduct to decide whether it should be allowed to continue given
the great weight which is to attach to the public interest in the
preservation of the environment. 25 The Environmental Protection
Act, like the Sherman Act, provides workable guidelines for judi-
cial inquiry.
3. Clear Legislative Intent Required
To be sure, the application of each of the statutes previously
discussed to specific fact situations could not be predicted with
precision. Forthright jurists have acknowledged, none more lu-
cidly than Justice Holmes in upholding the Sherman Act igainst a
charge of unconstitutional vagueness, that "[t]he law is full of
instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating right-
ly ... some matter of degree."'2 6 Yet, it would be wrong to say
that the courts have given cavalier treatment to the interests of
defendants in knowing what the law requires of them. The courts
realize that the defendant usually understands full well the intent
of the regulation at issue, is well aware of the alternatives he
might have chosen, and frequently comes to the court hoping to
win a battle which he lost in the legislature.
This point is well illustrated by the Minnesota Supreme Court's
decision in City of St. Paul v. Haugbro.2 7 The City of St. Paul
passed an ordinance prohibiting the emission of "dense smoke"
from chimneys. The court answered the vagueness challenge by
saying:
[NIor will any subtle distinction be indulged as to what is
24 Id. at 360.
2 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §691.1203(1) (Supp. 1971).28 Nash v. United States, 299 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
2793 Minn. 59, 100 N.W. 470 (1904).
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meant by 'dense smoke' as the terms are used in the ordi-
nance. The terms used will be understood as commonly em-
ployed and this court will understand by 'dense smoke' a
volume of dark, dense smoke as it comes from the smoke-
stack or chimney .... 28
The court knew that the defendants and all citizens were aware
that heating with soft coal was one of the most serious causes of
St. Paul's substantial winter air pollution problem. As a result, the
court would not tolerate defendant's effort to postpone the imple-
mentation of the legislation until the adoption of a specific regu-
lation for each class of polluters.
The implication of these cases on vagueness is that while a few
of the terms of each act in question may admit of some ambigtuty
in the abstract, the court will look to the statute as a whole-and
the practical context from which it emerged-in order to deter-
mine whether the law is sufficiently clear. Once the policy deci-
sion of the legislature is articulated, the court's role is to imple-
ment, not frustrate that policy. As the Indiana Supreme Court
stated in Illinois Steel Co. v. Fuller:29
When it is asserted that a statute is so indefinite ... the court
must consider the enactment in the light of the problems with
which the Legislature was undertaking to deal.... [S]uch
statutes are valid when they clearly designate the dangers and
hazards against which the Legislature sought to provide pro-
tection and reasonably indicate the means or methods by
which that is to be accomplished. (Emphasis supplied).
Courts often rely on the use of commonly used words as a
factor in the determination that the policy of an act is adequately
set forth so as to enable defendants to determine obligations. In
Smith v. Peterson,3 0 the California Court of Appeals dealt with
statutes making it a criminal offense to operate an automobile with
2 8 Id. at 472.
29 216 Ind. 180, 185, 23 N.E.2d 259, 262 (1939). See note 19 supra for a discussion of
the case. See also People v. Detroit Edison Co., 16 Mich. 423, 168 N.W.2d 320 (1969),
where defendant power company argued that it was unable to determine if it was in
violation of the statute because the definition of "smoke" in the statute was too ambiguous.
The court acknowledged the ambiguity, but answered that -[the common council chose
words and expressed intentions which are not capable of being so completely misunder-
stood by a company in the position of defendant which uses at least nine large smoke-
stacks." Id. at 428, 168 N.W.2d at 323. The court went on to affirm that
[i]t then may become the duty of the court to interpret and construe the word
or terms in the statute in order to give effect to the expressed intent of the
legislative body so as not to render the statute and the intent ineffective. Id.
at 426, 168 N.W.2d at 322. (Emphasis added).
See also Geraldine v. Miller, 322 Mich. 85, 33 N.W.2d 672 (1948); Benjamin v. City of
Huntington Woods, 349 Mich. 545, 84 N.W.2d 789 (1957).
30 131 Cal. App. 2d 241, 280 P.2d 522 (1955).
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a muffler which made "excessive noise." The court concluded
that the policy underlying the enactments was made clear by the
use of commonly used- terms: "while these are abstract words,
they have, through daily use, acquired a content that conveys to
any interested person a sufficiently accurate concept of what is
forbidden." 31
Analogously, the words in the Environmental Protection Act of
1970, "feasible and prudent alternatives" to "impairment" and
"destruction of the environment," have become familiar terms in
the law. "Feasible and prudent alternatives" appears in numerous
statutes3 2 and court opinions.33 Of course, "public health, safety,
and welfare" is a familiar legal phrase that describes concisely the
public interest, and "pollution, impairment, and destruction of the
environment" have been the subject of public and private nui-
sance law for centuries.3 4 No one would argue that the law of
nuisance is unconstitutionally vague, even though it is manifestly
clear that the doctrine proceeds from broad principles, and often
individuals cannot know exactly what the outcome in a particular
fact situation is going to be.3 5 To say that the Michigan Environ-
mental Protection Act is unconstitutional is to argue that the
legislature cannot create a new right in the common law tradition.
Courts have disposed of this question with little difficulty. In Air
31 Id. at 247, 280 P.2d at 527. "Words of common usage" have been held to comply with
constitutional requirements in a variety of settings. In Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374
(1932), the Court upheld a criminal statute requiring trucks carrying explosives to use the
"shortest practicable route":
'Shortest practicable route' is not an expression too vague to be under-
stood. The requirement of reasonable certainty does not preclude the use of
ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in com-
mon usage and understanding .... The use of common experience as a
glossary is necessary to meet the practical demands of legislation.
286 U.S. at 393.
32 See, e.g., § 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f)
(Supp. V, 1970):
[T]he Secretary shall not approve any program or project which requires the
use of any publicly owned land from a public park.., unless (I) there is no
feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land ....
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 39 U.S.L.W. 4287, 4290 (U.S. Mar. 2,
1971), the Supreme Court called the provision a "clear and specific directive."
33 See, e.g., Attorney General ex rel. Township of Wyoming v. City of Grand Rapids,
175 Mich. 503, 141 N.W. 890 (1913).
34 Air pollution was the subject of early nuisance cases. See James Bond's Case, Moore
K.B. 238, 72 Eng. Rep. 553 (1587) (injunction issued against the continued operation of a
pigeon-house), and William Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (1610) (smoke
from a lime kiln held to be a nuisance). See also Home Owners v. Detroit, 298 Mich. 622,
299 N.ifl. 740 (1941) (noxious gasses and odors); Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226
F. Supp. 169 (1963) (air pollution).3 5 The Massachusetts Supreme Court wrote, in Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216
Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371 (1914), dealing with air and noise pollution: "The law of
nuisance affords no rigid rule to be applied in all instances. It is elastic. It undertakes to
require only that which is fair and reasonable under all circumstances." Id. at 488, 104
N.E. at 373.
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Comm'n v. Coated Materials,3 6 a Pennsylvania court examined a
statute prohibiting pollution "which unreasonably interferes with
the comfortable enjoyment of life." To the argument that the
definition was unconstitutionally vague the court responded:
[T]he present contention that the definition of 'air pollution' is
uncertain ... cannot stand. The language employed in the
statute is equivalent to the definition of a nuisance which is
certainly firmly established in the law.3 7
The plain fact is that courts have accepted statutes regulating
economic interests in terms far less precise than the Environmen-
tal Protection Act. When complex activities require broad, in-
clusive regulatory statutes, courts require only that the legislature
articulate a clear policy direction."8 The court will render the
legislative effort nugatory only if the statute is so conflicting,
unclear or internally inconsistent that the court cannot ascertain
its intent. The policy behind the Environmental Protection Act is
well understood. The legislature stated concisely its desire that all
persons, public and private, examine with greater care the social
costs of their activities, and consider a broader range of alterna-
tives to protect the public right to environmental quality.
The vagueness argument is especially inappropriate in the case
of the Environmental Protection Act because of the context in
which the bill is to operate. Potential defendants under the Act
were subject to greater uncertainty about their duties not to pol-
lute before the bill was passed. For example, a Michigan industry
which is a source of both air and water pollution falls under the
rules and regulations of the Michigan Air Pollution Commission,
which specify that
[n]o person shall cause or permit the emission of an air
contaminant or water vapor. .. which causes or will cause
detriment to the safety, health, welfare, or comfort of any
person, or which causes or will cause damage to property of
business. 39
36 1 ENVIRONMENT REPORTER 1444 (1970).3 7 
Id. 1447.
38 In Redmond & Co. v. Securities Commission, 222 Mich. 1, 192 N.W. 688 (1923), the
Michigan Supreme Court upheld a license revocation for "good cause":
Must the law map out, for the guidance of the licensee, a code of ethics
and post danger signals against inhibited and dishonest practices? The
plaintiff had no right to have the conduct of its business charted by speci-
fications of forbidden practices involving revocation of the license. The
general scope and expressed purpose of the law, together with open and fair
dealing, entered the license and transgression thereof constituted good cause
for revocation thereof.
Id. at 6, 192 N.W. at 689-90.
39 MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. 336.46 (Supp. 1967).
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The standard of care for emissions into waterways is similarly
described:
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly to
discharge into the waters of the state any substance which is
or may become injurious to ... domestic, commercial, in-
dustrial, agricultural, recreational or other uses which are
being or may be made of such waters .... 40
Not only are the terms in these standards undefined, but neither
statute prohibits the agency from changing its interpretation of the
application of these broad prohibitions to a particular company or
industry. In addition, industries can be subject to suits under
private nuisance doctrine by nearby businesses and homeowners
and actions under public nuisance doctrine by a local prosecuting
attorney or a crusading State Attorney General. 41
The tendency of the Environmental Protection Act is not to
create greater uncertainty, but rather to coalesce these various
approaches into a single, unified standard for environmental
guardianship over the resources of the state. The real source of
uncertainty for potential defendants under the Act is not created
by the lack of precise definitions or specific regulations in the
statute, since that situation existed long before the Act became
law. The uncertainty derives from the fact that enforcement of the
law is no longer left to an understaffed administrative agency and
an overworked attorney general's office; any citizen can now
enter a court and insist that environmental quality be maintained.
Uncertainty has increased as to the likelihood of the law being
enforced, and it is not surprising that potential defendants are
unhappy at the prospect. Nevertheless, the prospect of more
vigorous law enforcement initiated by a variety of sources is
precisely the value sought by the legislature. It is hardly the
proper function of the courts to restrike that legislatively deter-
mined balance.
40 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 323.6(a) (1967).
41 MacGregor, Too Many Cooks, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 23, 1970, at 1, describes the
present situation in these terms:
A single polluter may have to cope with two agencies each (one for air, one
for water) at the city, county and state levels, plus a dozen Federal agencies.
Each regulatory body has its own standards, and they often compete with
each other for jurisdiction.
See also Detroit Free Press, Mar. 31, 1971, § A, at 15.
[Major industries] have recognized ... that standards they meet today may
prove inadequate tomorrow; they worry about investing millions on
anti-pollution facilities only to be told later that they'll have to spend millions
more on further improvement.
And federal officials.., can offer no assurances it won't happen.
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B. SEPARATION OF POWERS
While vagueness deals with the ambiguity of obligations im-
posed by the statute, the separation of powers or delegation
question focuses on the nature of the tasks assigned to the court.
Historically, the separation of powers doctrine has been used to
prevent delegations of non-judicial functions to the court. In the
context of the Environmental Protection Act, two separation of
powers questions may arise: (1) whether the broad language of the
law delegates too much of the legislature's policy-making author-
ity to the courts, and (2) whether the Act delegates to the courts
too much control over decisions made by state administrative
agencies.
1. Delegation of Legislative Authority
By following a common law approach, the legislature vested
significant discretion in the courts to elucidate the precise impact
of the Act in particular cases. In large part the reason for this
broad delegation was the fact that new evidence is constantly
being discovered about the effects of current policies and tech-
nologies upon the environment. Since the legislature cannot reex-
amine annually every policy or regulation set down in the past, a
substantial time lag has resulted between the development of
scientific knowledge and changes in specific legislative programs.
The common law approach, constructed upon a general policy of
maintaining environmental quality, results in a decision-making
process more sensitive to new evidence and discoveries. 42
Much like the vagueness question, the improper delegation
issue involves the determination of whether the bill must be more
specific to avoid excessive delegation of the legislature's pol-
icy-making authority to the courts. Unfortunately, judical at-
tempts to define the degree of power which may be delegated to
42 E.g., when broad spectrum pesticides like DDT and Dieldrin were introduced, legisla-
tion was based on the assumption that they were unmixed blessings. Throughout the
1960's, a growing number of scientists and conservationists tried unsuccessfully to per-
suade the departments of agriculture at the state and federal level to consider the dele-
terious effects of the pesticides. Even as evidence mounted, the inertia of the previous
decision maintained a bias against a thorough examination-by government agencies and
the agricultural industry-of alternatives such as genetic or predator control.
In 1967 the West Michigan Action Council instituted an action to prevent the Michigan
Department of Agriculture from authorizing and participating in using Dieldrin. Had there
been an Environmental Protection Act in 1967 perhaps the court would have decided-as
the Department of Agriculture finally did-to limit the use of Dieldrin and DDT instead of
summarily rejecting the case. At the very least, the evidence of the harmful effects of such
pesticides and possible alternatives could have been brought into focus by a court decision.
The legislature could have subsequently rejected, modified, or codified that decision in a
specific statute.
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the courts have done little more than restate the issue. 43 It is
tempting simply to argue that the Act does not violate the separa-
tion of powers principle because it sets forth existing obligations
which the courts only interpret in each particular case. Never-
theless, there is much judicial rhetoric which, taken literally, sug-
gests that functions of one branch must not be related to the
functions of another branch. 44
The determination and implementation of legislative policy is,
of course, an appropriate function for the courts. In fact, most
laws require the courts to interpret and shape the legislative
policy as it is applied to specific fact situations.
In each of the cases cited previously in which broad remedial
statutes were upheld, the court performed a policy-shaping func-
tion.45 In this context, the essential role of the courts is to imple-
ment, not frustrate, the legislative will. Once a policy is articu-
lated in language which, though broad, has a meaning given by
common usage and the historical context from which the legisla-
tion emerges, the courts will apply the law in individual cases. 46
In Johnson v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines Inc.,4 7 the Michigan
Supreme Court upheld an amendment to the garnishee statute
which stated: "the court may, at any time before judgment, for
43 E.g., the Michigan Supreme Court explained the distinction between legislative and
judicial powers in the following terms:
The legislature makes the law-courts apply it. To enact laws is an exercise
of legislative power; to interpret them is an exercise of judicial power. To
declare what the law shall be is legislative; to declare what it is or has been is
judicial. The legislative power proscribes rules of action. The judicial power
determines whether, in a particular case, such rules of action have been
transgressed. The legislature prescribes rules for the future. The judiciary
ascertains existing rights.
In re Consolidated Freight Co., 265 Mich. 340, 343, 251 N.W. 431, 433-34 (1933).
44 There is broad dicta regarding delegation of powers in old Michigan cases which can
be misconstrued if viewed outside their historical contexts. In Civil Service Comm'n v.
Auditor General, 302 Mich. 673, 5 N.W.2d 536 (1942), the Civil Service Commission
claimed the right to set salaries to be paid by the auditor general without the passage of an
appropriations bill; in Wood v. State Administrative Bd., 255 Mich. 220, 238 N.W. 16
(193 1), the Governor asserted the power to lower items in an appropriations bill rather
than vetoing the bill. It is not surprising that intrusions into the most fundamental legisla-
tive power- the power of the purse -elicited strong language from the court.
4E.g., the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964), was first literally interpreted to
prohibit any contract which in fact restrained competition. United States v. Joint Traffic
Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). Subsequently, the Supreme Court developed a "Rule of
Reason," Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), and from this evolved a
host of judicial rules on the subject. To say that the Court was not involved in pol-
icy-making would be erroneous; yet, the courts did not consider this rule a usurpation of
the legislative function. The Court was giving effect to a policy which the Congress has
articulated, albeit in broad terms.
4While the legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, where it is difficult or
impossible to lay down a definite comprehensive rule for the application of a statute, the
legislature may vest authority in the courts to determine whether the law applies in a
particular instance.
47357 Mich. 254, 98 N.W.2d 586 (1959).
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good cause shown, discontinue proceedings against the garnishee,
or make any such other reasonable order as in its discretion seems
advisable." 48 The court reasoned that the legislature was asking it
to perform a function with which it was very familiar; "U]udicial
discretion upon good cause shown is a standard in itself
sufficient to satisfy all constitutional requirements. '" 49
The First Circuit Court of Appeals responded similarly in
upholding the Auto Dealer's Day in Court Act.50 The Act gives
automobile dealers a cause of action against a manufacturer who
fails to act in "good faith" in terminating, or failing to renew, a
franchise. 51 The court concluded that the language and history of
the Act made it clear that Congress intended to prohibit "unfair
and inequitable" conduct. Thus, while "[i]t may be true that the
statute in effect delegates some responsibility to the
courts... this is neither unusual nor unconstitutional. ' 5 2 By this
standard the Environmental Protection Act is not an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative authority. Furthermore, the bill
is no more a usurpation of the legislative role than is the prior
common law in Michigan, since common law courts have been
deciding what is "pollution" and "feasible and prudent alterna-
tives" thereto for many years.
Consider, for example, Attorney General ex rel. Township of
Wyoming v. City of Grand Rapids,53 a Michigan public nuisance
case. It was alleged that the City of Grand Rapids was dumping
raw sewage into Grand River in such quantities that the river was
becoming severely polluted. The Supreme Court first examined
the evidence to see whether the pollution was sufficient to con-
stitute a public nuisance. After hearing testimony from citizens of
the affected cities, academic experts, and state public health
officials, the court concluded that the polluting substances were
coming from Grand Rapids sewers, and that the effects were
significant enough to constitute a public nuisance. The defendant
481 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 628.41 (1948) (repealed 1963) (now MICH. GEN. CT. R. 738).
49 357 Mich. at 257, 98 N.W.2d at 588.
50 15 U.S.C. § 6 1221-25 (1964). Volkswagen InterAmericana S.A. v. Rohlson, 360
F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1966).
51 "Good faith" is defined as
the duty of each party to any franchise ... to act in a fair and equitable
manner toward each other so as to guarantee the one party freedom from
coercion, intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation from the other
party: Provided, That recommendation, endorsement, exposition, persuasion,
urging or argument shall not be deemed to constitute a lack of good faith. 15
U.S.C. § 1221(e) (1964).
The court construed the definition to mean that 'jilt must appear that the condition was
unfair or inequitable." 360 F.2d at 442.
52 360 F.2d at 445.
53 175 Mich. 503, 141 N.W. 890 (1913).
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responded that the city could not practically dispose of the sew-
age in any other manner. Evidence was taken regarding possible
alternative methods of treatment; whether they could accomplish
sufficient purification of sewage so that it could be emptied into a
stream without damage or creating a nuisance; and whether such
facilities "for a city the size of Grand Rapids [were] feasible." 54
After considering all of the evidence the court concluded that
the public nuisance created by the city's dumping was "inflicting
irreparable injury, which it is the peculiar office of a court of
equity to prevent." 55 (Emphasis added). It went on to hold that
"the construction of a septic tank or septic tanks by the defend-
ants within a reasonable time is feasible and practicable .... 56
(Emphasis supplied). Grand Rapids is only one of many examples
where courts have examined the impact of defendant's conduct,
the availability of feasible and prudent alternatives, and imple-
mented the public policy against pollution. 57 The courts have
clearly not usurped the legislative function in developing thi law
of nuisance, despite the policy-making necessarily involved. IHad
the Environmental Protection Act granted standing to p ivate
citizens in actions to abate public nuisances, surely no one would
have objected that an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority was involved. Yet the bill describes in greater detail the
issues to be considered and the policy to be followed in individual
cases than does the concept of nuisance, the content of which is
simply the principle "[u]se your own property in such a manner as
not to injure that of another."5 8
Both the unquestioned role of the courts in nuisance cases and
the broad statutes regularly upheld by the courts suggest that the
Environmental Protection Act does not grant unconstitutional
law-making powers to the courts.
In addition, the charge of improper delegation seems in-
appropriate considering the recent development and application of
54 Id. at 517, 141 N.W. 895.
55 Id. at 535, 141 N.W. 901.56 Id. at 543, 141 N.W. 904.
57 In the widely cited case of Hurlburt v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 238,
118 P. 928 (1911), the California Supreme Court upheld a decree limiting defendant's
cement production to 88,706 barrels per year, rather than its capacity of 900,000 barrels
per year, to lessen the impact on a neighboring orchard.
In Renken v. Harvey Aluminum Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963), the court
ordered the defendant to install hoods and electrostatic precipitators on its aluminum
reduction plant in order to reduce flouride emissions which were damaging adajacent
farmland. In Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371 (1914), the
court balanced the interests of a quarry owner against that of local residents, but rejected
plaintiffs request that it order production to halt. Instead the court ordered that defendant
pursue several alternatives to reduce smoke and noise pollution.
18 Attorney General v. Grand Rapids, 175 Mich. 503, 543, 141 N.W. 890, 904 (1913).
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the concept of delegation of powers. Courts have invalidated
delegations of policy-making authority to administrative agencies
in part to prevent the exercise of excessive power which could be
allowed by overly broad delegations.5 9 The Environmental Pro-
tection Act is consistent with this approach, for its fundamental
purpose is to limit the scope of agency discretion by imposing a
legal standard, enforceable by the courts, in place of the ex-
tremely broad discretion the agencies previously had.
Finally, where the legislature intentionally determined that the
courts should develop a common law for protection of the envi-
ronment, it would be ironic to argue that the bill gives too much
power to the courts. For in the same breath the defendant would
be asking the same court to arrogate to itself the ultimate power of
reversing the legislature's fundamental policy decision that the
courts should play a larger role in environmental protection.6" The
proper response of the courts is perhaps illustrated by Justice
Frankfurter's comments when construing the phrase "substantial
evidence on the whole record" in the Administrative Procedure
Act:
59 The fear of arbitrary agency action has led the Michigan Supreme Court to invalidate
delegations to administrative agencies. See, e.g., Osius v. City of St. Clair Shores, 344
Mich. 693, 75 N.W.2d 25 (1956), (a delegation to a zoning board of appeals of the power
to grant a variance without any standards by which a reviewing court might measure the
validity of the decision); Hoyt Bros. Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 260 Mich. 447, 245
N.W. 509 (1932) (city ordinance allowed city manager to license charities if in his
judgment "the charity is a worthy one and that the person or persons ... are fit and
responsible parties." Id. at 450, 245 N.W. at 510); Central Advertising Co. v. State
Highway Comm'n, 12 Mich. App. 314, 162 N.W.2d 834 (1968) (highway commission not
allowed to place restrictive covenants on land despite provision that it could sell land not
needed, on whatever terms it may deem proper).
In recent years, the state courts have followed the lead of the federal courts in allowing
delegations which seem quite broad indeed by earlier standards. 6 K. DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 201 (1958). The Michigan Supreme Court has, in recent years,
followed a less rigid approach than in the past, to allow broad delegations. See, e.g.,
McKibbon v. Michigan Corp. & Sec. Comm'n, 369 Mich. 69, 119 N.W.2d 557 (1963)
(upheld statute granting commission power to revoke licenses for "dishonest or unfair
dealings"); School District v. State Bd. of Educ., 367 Mich. 591, 116 N.W.2d 866 (1962)
(delegation of discretionary power to county boards of education to detach territory from
one school district and attach it to another making "equitable payment" for the property
taken).
60 It is tempting to draw an analogy between the breadth of authority which can be
delegated to courts and agencies. If the same limitation applied to both, the Act would not
fail as a delegation of legislative authority. See note 59 supra. But the analogy is funda-
mentally inapt, for the courts have the responsibility to construe constitutional provisions
which are broad by design, and to interpret the statutes pursuant to which agencies
function. The difference between the breadth of discretion allowed to courts and agencies
is rarely made explicit. In City of Saginaw v. Budd, 381 Mich. 173, 160 N.W.2d 906
(1968), the court rejected an ordinance allowing the health inspector to demolish aban-
doned buildings which he found "by reason of inadequate maintenance, dilapidation,
obsolesence, or abandonment" to be a public nuisance. While rejecting such broad powers
in a bureaucrat, the court "recognized a city's right to proceed in court to abate a nuisance,
and nothing in this opinion should be interpreted to prevent plaintiff from taking further
proper action against the defendants." Id. at 178, 160 N.W.2d at 908.
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It is fair to say that in all this Congress expressed a mood.
And it expressed its mood not merely by oratory but by
legislation. As legislation that mood must be respected, even
though it can only serve as a standard for judgment and not as
a body of rigid rules assuring sameness of application. En-
forcement of such broad standards implies subtlety of mind
and solidity of judgment. But it is not for us to question that
Congress may assume such qualities in the Federal
Judiciary. 6
l
2. Delegation of a Non-Judicial Function
The widespread use of administrative agencies is an experiment
launched in full force only in this century. 62 The Environmental
Protection Act of 1970 should be viewed as a part of a current
movement in the law to make the administrative system a more
effectual, responsive one. To that end the Act is a fundamental
departure from the traditional model in which initiative rests sole-
ly with an administrative agency. The citizen no longer "comes to
a regulatory agency as a supplicant, requesting that they under-
take to examine and to pursue his rights." 63 Instead he comes "as
a claimant [with] no insulation of administrative discretion be-
tween him and his claims." 64 Honefully in the courts, citizens'
concerns will obtain a more receptive hearing.
In order to effectuate the Act's concept of individual action and
policy of environmental protection, the courts are given three
powers: (1) where regulatory agencies have not acted to halt
pollution, the court may issue an order upon the request of private
or public plaintiffs; 65 (2) where the plaintiff demonstrates that an
agency has not enforced the standard established in the Act, the
court is to adjudicate defendant's conduct and determine whether
the agency is allowing him to pollute despite feasible and prudent
alternatives; 66 (3) where plaintiffs show that a defendant's conduct
violates the Act, even though in compliance with the standard of
an agency, the court is not bound by the standard, but may "direct.
the adoption of a standard approved and specified by the court."
6 7
61 Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1950), construing § 10 of
the Administrative Procedure Act.
62 Elihu Root, then President of the American Bar Association, addressed the A.B.A.
convention only fifty years ago about the creation of a body of administrative law, as an
experiment which will go forward. 41 A.B.A. REP. 355, 368-69 (1916).
63 117 CONG. REC. S 555 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1971) (Remarks of Professor Joseph L.
Sax).
64 Id.
5 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1204(2) (Supp. 197 1).6 6 1d. §§ 691.1204(3), 691.1205(l)-(2).
67 Id. § 691 I. 1202(2)(a)- (b).
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The consideration requiring discussion is whether any of these
powers conferred upon the courts is a non-judicial function.
a. Administrative Agencies Fail to Act-One difficulty faced
by regulatory bodies is that they are rarely given staffs com-
mensurate with the number and size of the problems which they
must resolve. The inevitable result is that some violations are
overlooked or prohibitory action is postponed. In response to this
problem, the Act allows private or public attorneys general to
bring a court action against an alleged polluter who has not been
subject to regulatory sanction. 68
Whether the agency or a court must decide the case in the first
instance is a primary jurisdiction question. Primary jurisdiction is
not a constitutional doctrine, but a judicial doctrine developed to
provide orderly and efficient management of cases in which the
courts and agencies have overlapping jurisdiction, and to give
effect to the intent of the legislature-when expressed-that the
agency should decide first. 69 The Environmental Protection Act
provides that if the pleadings show a need for the agency to
examine the case, the court may remand. Nevertheless, where the
only value likely to be gained by a remand may be further delay,
with continued unnecessary degradation of the environment, the
legislature has given the courts jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case. The question of whether the court should be required to
remand is a question of policy which the legislature has resolved.
b. Review of Agency Action-The legislature was also con-
cerned that agencies maintain a vigorous effort to prevent the
further destruction of the environment. For this reason the legisla-
tors incorporated into the Act a standard for all agency action
affecting the environment. 70 Moreover, the Act provides that citi-
zens may challenge an agency action as inconsistent with the Act,
and provides that on review of such agency determinations the
68 Id. § 691.1204(2).
69See Sengstock, Administrative Law, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 59, 68 (1967). See also
Arnold v. Ellis, 5 Mich. App. 101, 145 N.W.2d 822 (1966). The court decided a case
under a riparian rights theory which could have been decided by the Department of
Natural Resources under the Inland Lakes Level Act of 1961. The court argued that
where jurisdictions of court and agency overlap, in the absence of clear legislative intent to
confer exclusive jurisdiction on the agency, an equitable action was proper when the
agency had elected not to act.7 0 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1205(2) (Supp. 1971):
In any such administrative, licensing or other proceedings, and in any
judicial review thereof, any alleged pollution, impairment or destruction of
the air, water or other natural resources or the public trust therein, shall be
determined, and no conduct shall be authorized or approved which does, oi is
likely to have such effect so long as there is a feasible and prudent alternative
consistent with the reasonable requirements of the public health, safety and
welfare.
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court shall determine whether there is or is likely to be impair-
ment of the environment, and shall not permit the agency to
authorize such conduct where there are feasible and prudent
alternatives, consistent with the public welfare. 71
There were two important reasons for allowing the courts to
adjudicate the defendant's conduct in accord with the standards of
the Act and not be bound by the rulings of the agencies. First, the
present scope of review of administrative action is complicated at
best, and totally confusing at worst. Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 72 recently decided in the United States Su-
preme Court, is illustrative of the problem faced by courts in
attempting to review administrative determinations. The Federal
Aid to Highways Act of 1968 provided that the Secretary of
Transportation should not permit a highway to be built through a
park unless there were "no feasible and prudent alternatives"7 3 to
the construction. The Court decided that the appropriate standard
for review of the administrative action was whether the choice
made by the Secretary was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 74
Delineating the proper scope of judicial review under this stan-
dard, Justice Marshall noted that a court should allow a "pre-
sumption" in favor of the Secretary, but conduct "a probing
review;" a court's inquiry is to be "searching," but "narrow;" a
court is to invalidate any "clear error in judgment," but not
"substitute its judgment for that of the agency." 75 The opinion
reflects the confusion which presently pervades the law on review
of administrative decisions, a confusion resulting from the limita-
tions inherent in a test which does not allow the court to deter-
mine issues on the basis of the weight of the evidence. An addi-
tional consequence of this confusion is the unpredictable variety
of outcomes when courts review administrative rulings. 76
To avoid these shortcomings, the Michigan legislature chose to
71 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 1205 (1)-(2) (Supp. 1971).
7239 U.S.L.W. 4287 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1971).
7349 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (Supp. V, 1970).
74 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (Supp. V, 1970).
75 The opinion of the Court stated:
Certainly, the Secretary's decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity
(citations omitted). But that presumption is not to shield his actions from a
thorough, probing in-depth review.
To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision was
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a
clear error of judgment (citations omitted). Although this inquiry into the
facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a
narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency. 39 U.S.L.W. 4287, 4291-92 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1971).76See generally J. Sax, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 125-48 (1970).
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establish a legal standard, and provide for judicial determination
of whether an agency action is in compliance with the policy of
the legislature. The court is not asked to substitute its judgment as
to the reasonableness of an administrative decision, but only to
determine whether the administrative decision is consistent with a
legal standard. 77
Article 6, section 28, of the Michigan Constitution of 1963
provides the framework for judicial review of administrative deci-
sions:
All final decisions, findings, rulings and orders of any admin-
istrative officer or agency existing under the constitution or
by law, which are judicial or quasi-judicial and affect private
rights or licenses, shall be subject to direct review by the
courts as provided by law. This review shall include, as a
minimum, the determination whether such final decisions,
findings, rulings and orders are authorized by law; and, in
cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same are
supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on
the whole record. 78 (Emphasis supplied.)
Given the explicit command that courts, at a minimum, should
examine whether agency decisions are "authorized by law," the
power to decide whether an agency decision authorizes conduct in
violation of the Environmental Protection Act seems well within
the power given the courts. Moreover, by adding that adminis-
trative decisions "shall be subject to direct review as provided by
law," the constitution authorizes the legislature to detail the scope
of review in subsequent legislation. 79
In enacting the Environmental Protection Act, the legislature
made full use of this constitutional authorization by allowing the
courts to make a fresh determination of whether certain conduct
is causing pollution, and whether there are feasible and prudent
alternatives less environmentally destructive 80
The range of judicial review now available under Michigan law
77 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 1205(2) (Supp. 1971).
78 MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 28.
79 See Cooper, Administrative Law, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1963). See also Lorland Civic
Ass'n v. DiMatteo, 10 Mich. App. 129, 157 N.W.2d 1 (1968). The court reviewing the
grant of a variance from the zoning act, notes that MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 28 provides a
minimum scope of review and that "neither the enabling act nor the ordinance state a more
generous standard of review." Id. at 135-6, 157 N.W.2d at 4-5. The implication of the
court's s tatement is that the act could have provided for a broader scope of review. The
Administrative Procedure Act, the review provisions added to the statutes of some
administrative agencies, and the Environmental Protection Act of 1970 are laws to give
effect to art. 6, § 28.
So MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 1205(2) (Supp. 1971).
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is illustrated by Fisher-New Center Co. v. Tax Comm'n.8 1 The
petitioner argued that his property was substantially over-valued
for state property tax purposes. At issue was whether the Tax
Commission's finding of the rate of return on investment was
proper. The commission argued that the determination of the
figure was within its discretion, and that the court must uphold its
determination in view of the fact that there was conflicting expert
testimony in the record. The court held, however, that it must
make an independent evaluation of whether the decision was
supported by the evidence on the record. After undertaking such
review, the court concluded that
the commission findings are not supported by competent,
material and substantial evidence, are unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted,
and are contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence;
that this constitutes an error of law; that such error presents a
question for judicial determination and, upon judicial review,
the constitutional grounds and requirement for reversal, un-
der Michigan Constitution of 1963, art 6, § 28, namely, error
of law and adoption of wrong principles.8 2
The court then directed the commission to "recompute the valu-
ation and assessment of the taxpayer's property at a capitalization
rate within the range established by the competent evidence in
this record"83 (emphasis added), as determined by the court.
Thus, the court not only made its own determination of wheth-
er the Tax Commission's decision met legal requirements set forth
in the Administrative Procedure Act, but also determined the
range of alternatives the commission could choose in light of
those requirements. Had the court merely reversed the decision,
the agency could well have reached a new determination outside
the range supported by the evidence, and still another appeal and
remand would have followed. The court avoided this possibility,
as does the Environmental Protection Act, by requiring the court
to adjudicate the existence of pollution and whether there are
feasible and prudent alternatives.
The same approach was followed in Thomas v. Busch8 4 where
the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed the grant of a variance
by a zoning review board for the construction of an insurance
office building. The court refused to accept the "mere repetition"
81380 Mich. 340, 157 N.w.2d 271 (1968), rev'd on rehearing, 381 Mich. 713, 167
N.w.2d 263 (1969).
82 381 Mich. at 715, 167 N.W.2d at 264.
83 Id.
847 Mich. App. 245, 151 N.W.2d 391 (1967).
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of the language of the zoning ordinance, and independently deter-
mined whether the facts met the legal requirements in the ordi-
nance for the grant of a variance. The court concluded that the
conclusory and inferential findings of the board were insufficient
to support the variance, and proceeded to grant a permanent
injunction against construction.8 5 Realizing that a remand might
bring the same case again before the court with the same facts but
more carefully drafted findings, the court explicitly rejected the
alternative of remanding the case to the zoning appeals board:
Such a course of action, in effect permitting the board to
repair its faulty performance, does not recommend itself to us
as the proper course of action .... 86
These cases indicate that courts have in the past made in-
dependent evaluations of the legality of agency action. Some
commentators have gone further to suggest that it is always the
role of the courts to ultimately determine whether the decision of
an administrative agency comports with a legal standard set down
by the legislature.8 7 Thus, in giving courts the authority to decide
whether an agency has allowed pollution where there exist fea-
sible and prudent alternatives, the Act cannot be said to delegate
a non-judicial function.
c. Agency Standards -Section 2 of the Act describes the prop-
er posture of the court when plaintiff alleges that "standards for
pollution or for anti-pollution device or procedure" are not strict
85 Michigan courts have issued similar orders in several zoning variance cases. See, e.g.,
Farah v. Sacks, 10 Mich. App. 198, 157 N.W.2d 9 (1968). Puritan-Greenfield Improve-
ment Ass'n v. Leo, 7 Mich. App. 659, 153 N.W.2d 162 (1967); Tireman-Joy-Chicago
Improvement Ass'n v. Chernick, 361 Mich. 211, 105 N.W.2d 57 (1960). In each case the
court held that the necessary findings were not supported by evidence in the record, and
went on to render a decision that the facts in each precluded the grant of a variance. But
see Roll v. City of Troy, 370 Mich. 94, 120 N.w.2d 804 (1963).
87 Mich. App. 245, 256, 151 N.W.2d 391, 396 (1967). For a case where a federal court
decided whether an agency decision violated a legal standard, see Office of Comm. of
United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Commenting on the
record of F.C.C. hearings which culminated in the renewal of a broadcast license to station
WLBT in Jackson, Mississippi, the court stated:
The record now before us leaves us with a profound concern over the entire
handling of this case following the remand to the Commission. The impa-
tience with the Public Intervenors, the hostility toward their efforts to satisfy
a surprisingly strict standard of proof, plain errors in rulings and findings lead
us, albeit reluctantly, to the conclusion that it will serve no useful purpose to
ask the Commission to reconsider the Examiner's actions and its own Deci-
sion and Order under a correct allocation of the burden of proof. The
administrative conduct reflected in this record is beyond repair....
For this reason the grant of a license must be vacated forthwith and the
Commission is directed to invite applications to be filed for the license.
425 F.2d at 550.
87 L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 575 (1965).
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enough, given the legislative policy set down in the Act."" Section
2(a) provides that the compliance with an agency standard is not a
complete defense, for the court may "[d]etermine the validity,
applicability, and reasonableness of the standard." 8 9 Section 2(b)
provides further that "[w]hen a court finds a standard to be
deficient, [it may] direct the adoption of a standard approved and
specified by the court." 90
The legislature in enacting section 2 did not intend that the
court should conduct ex parte hearings, call in experts to testify,
and assume the rule-making function of the agency. The Act need
not and should not be read as imposing that responsibility on the
courts. Indeed the language and structure of the statute make
clear that the legislature intended no such role for the courts.
Section 2 begins with the phrase, "In granting relief provided by
subsection one;" 91 that is, that the validity of a standard is to be
determined only in the context of a particular case in which one
defendant's conduct is being adjudicated. Thus, in an appropriate
case the court may determine the proper remedy for the individual
defendant before it, and inform the agency that the agency stan-
dard is inadequate and another must be adopted that is consistent
with the legal requirements of the Act.
As a practical matter, the standards set by the courts will affect
future parties not before the court in several respects. Where a
court ruling in a particular case would be equally applicable in
other, similar situations, it is to be expected that the public agency
will go back and reconsider its rules of general application, rather
than requiring the-same issue to be litigated numerous times. And,
of course, the decision in any given case may have a powerful
precedential importance for other potential cases. These result
from the conventional stare decisis effect of a particular decision,
and so long as the court's judgment is issued in a particular
controversy, as the decision in that case-which is what the
Environmental Protection Act contemplates-no problem is
raised of exceeding the judicial function rule that courts should
decide only the cases before them.
Thus the key issue in deciding whether a power is non-judicial
is whether the question facing the court arises in a traditional
adversary setting. As a Michigan court explained in Chamberlain
v. Detroit Edison Co.,92
8 8 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202 (Supp. 1971).
89 Id. § 691.1202(a).
9 0 id. § 691.1202(b).
91 Id. § 69I.1202.
92 14 Mich. App. 565, 165 N.w.2d 845 (1968). The case concerned whether judges
could be authorized to preside over condemnation proceedings and to determine the
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[w]hether a function is nonjudicial, for purposes of the sepa-
ration of powers principle, often will depend on the manner in
which it is expected to be discharged....
In most cases, as long as the court can function as a court
in deciding the question, receiving and applying factual testi-
mony against identifiable standards, laws and rules of law, the
function conferred will not be regarded as nonjudicial. 93
It is therefore significant that the Act contemplates that the court
may direct the adoption of a different standard only in the context
of a particular case. The fact that a new agency standard of
general application is likely to emerge from the decision in a
particular case does not change the nature of the proceeding
before the court from a judicial to an administrative one.
So long as this fundamental limitation on the judicial function is
not violated, the question remains one of ascertaining legislative
intent. That is the true issue raised by the Act, and it is not a
constitutional matter. Professor Cooper has pointed out that legis-
lative intent-rather than constitutional considerations-has been
the key factor influencing judicial willingness to thoroughly exam-
ine agency standards:
Where the purpose of the statute is to vest broad dis-
cretionary powers in an agency ... a broad measure of au-
tonomy will be accorded the agency; and there will be a
tendency to view its rules as in harmony with the statute and
reasonable. Where, on the other hand, the statute does not
disclose a purpose of any such broad grant of power to the
agency.., the courts will be more ready to discover a
conflict between the statute and the rule, or to hold that the
rule attempts to enlarge the statute, or is unreasonable. 94
In the context of the Environmental Protection Act, the legisla-
ture sought to restrict the role of administrative agencies by
allowing the courts to subject agency discretion, as reflected in
administratively adopted rules, to a legal standard; and to do so in
a way calculated to conserve private and judicial energy traditi-
onally expended on unnecessary multiple suits or remanded ac-
tions. Clearly, in some cases, a range of policies not before the
court will need to be considered prior to the adoption of a new
question of "necessity." Petitioners argued that "necessity" was a legislative question,
therefore unassignable to the courts. The court responded that while the issue was in a
sense legislative, "[tihe procedure ... follows the adversary form customary in common
law courts .... [and] the probate court is required to function as a court in adjudicating the
controverted issue of necessity." Id. at 576-77, 165 N.W.2d at 85 1.
93 Id. at 576, 165 N.W.2d at 85 1.
94 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 263 (1965).
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standard, and it would seem that the agency could best serve this
role. However, to approve remand in this limited case suggests
only that the court should resolve the question of whether it can
properly direct the adoption of a different standard according to
the facts of each case, and not that it should erect a constitutional
barrier preventing it from enforcing a standard it finds legally
determinative in an appropriate case.
There is no single response appropriate to all cases. The court,
where necessary, should remand to the agency. Where the issue is
capable of judicial resolution, and the public interest requires an
expeditious resolution of the matter, the correct response is for
the court to specify the proper standard. 95 A third way in which
the court may implement section 2(b)9 6 is to order the agency to
adopt a new standard which falls within a range, any of the points
of which it finds consistent with the requirements of the Environ-
mental Protection Act. This approach has the advantage of pre-
serving some flexibility in the agency's decision-making, while
avoiding repeated judicial review and remands by indicating the
range within which the agency can properly exercise its dis-
cretion. 97
A final alternative is suggested by the decision in In re Ten
Mile Drain,98 which involved a review of an intra-county drainage
board's decision that the state should be charged a percentage of
the estimated cost of the drain's construction. The board had
applied a formula which it had been using for thirty years to
determine the state's proper assessment. The state, however,
offered a detailed engineering study which indicated that their
share should be decreased. Faced with the two alternatives, the
court found the state's evidence decisive and ordered that
the drainage board shall hold a new hearing.., and requiring
further-in the absence of new proof tending to overcome the
State's present showing-that the board enter an order ac-
cepting the State's calculation of the "State highway" share.99
95 Magnuson v. Kent County Canvassers, 370 Mich. 649, 122 N.W.2d 808 (1963), is an
example of a court determining a legally required standard. The county board of canvas-
sers had decided that the relevant statute permitted them to allow an annexation of a part
of one city by another on the basis of (1) the vote of the area to be annexed, and (2) the
combined vote of the two cities. The trial court felt bound by the agency determination,
but the Michigan Supreme Court ordered that the annexation be certified only upon a
positive vote by the area to be annexed and the vote of each of the two cities counted
separately. The Michigan Supreme Court held that it was free to choose a rule since the
statute did not determine the particular alternative to be solicited.
96 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(b) (Supp. 1971).
97 This approach was taken in Fisher-New Center Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 380 Mich. 340,
157 N.W.2d 271 (1968), rev'don rehearing, 381 Mich. 713, 167 N.W.2d 263 (1969).
98371 Mich. 209, 123 N.W.2d 719 (1963).
9 9
Id. at 213, 123 N.w.2d at 721.
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The order in In re Ten Mile Drain is analogous to that which
might be made under the Environmental Protection Act. The
Attorney General did not challenge the standard in the abstract,
but rather in the context of a particular case. In order to decide
the case before it, the court had to determine the validity and
reasonableness of the prior agency practice, and it specified a
standard to be adopted in the absence of further relevant and
conflicting evidence. Judge Friendly explained in a recent envi-
ronmental case that such questions are
entirely appropriate for judicial consideration at this time.
The formulation of standards for suspension is entrusted to
the Secretary in the first instance, but the court has an obliga-
tion to ensure that the administrative standards conform to
the legislative purpose .... 0
C. CONCLUSION
Each of the questions discussed in this note revolve around the
same basic issue: the propriety of vesting broad power in the
courts to prevent environmental destruction, and to develop an
environmental common law. The need for the broad standard of
the Act derives from the complexity of the problem. The clear
authority of the courts to decide cases which have been, or should
have been dealt with by an administrative agency is important
both for the relationship it establishes between citizens and
agencies, and to insure that the policies of the Act will be imple-
mented. In responding to these needs the legislature appears to
have violated no constitutional barrier.
Perhaps the best way to conclude this note is to call attention
to one of the first cases to be filed under the new law.101 The case
involved a small local township which was piping inadequately
treated sewage just upstream from the plaintiffs-a community
and a property owner. Defendant planned to enlarge the capacity
of the sewage system without adequately improving its waste
treatment facility. The case is a model of one situation for which
the Act was created. Plaintiffs are challenging in court a municipal
decision which affects their daily lives, where pollution is contin-
uing despite the existence of readily available alternatives, and
where the appropriate administrative agency has not been moved
to act.102 At this stage a preliminary injunction has been granted
100 Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruchelshaus, (D.C. Cir. No. 23,183) (decided Jan.
7, 1971).
101 Lakeland Property Owners Ass'n v. Township of Northfield, C.A. 1453 (Cir. Ct.,
Livingston County, Mich., filed Sept. 24, 1970).
102 The judge first denied defendant's motion to remand the case to the Water Resources
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by the judge (1) prohibiting the proposed enlargement of the
facility, and (2) prohibiting additional businesses and dwellings
from tapping into the sewage system until the case is resolved.
This initial decision upholds the confidence of the legislature in
the capacity of the judiciary to understand and deal with environ-
mental problems. As expressed by Professor Joseph Sax in recent
testimony before a committee of the Texas Legislature:
It is notable that the judge recognized the fundamental
purpose of the law.. . [and] felt free to enter an order respon-
sive to the genuine problem with which he was faced; the
problem of residential and industrial growth outstripping the
ability of the community to provide needed public services.
He saw the new law as allowing him to take steps designed to
bring those two matters into phase.
I say this is heartening because the judge in this case
recognized-and responded-to the legislature's effort to
bring back to environmental regulation the ... approach of
the common law. The problem is recognized in a straight-
forward manner and those who are adversely affected are
authorized to bring their complaint to a court for investigation
of the facts and an equitable resolution. 103
-Roger L. Conner*
Commission. He stated in a formal ruling that he was not required to remand where the
exercise of his equitable power was necessary to prevent pollution from being increased,
adding that the Commission had taken an interest in the problem only as a result of the
lawsuit.
103 Hearings on H.B. 56 Before the Comm. on State Affairs, House of Representatives
of Texas on H.B. 56, An Environmental Protection Act, March 15, 1971. The Act is
modeled after the Michigan Act.
* This note draws heavily upon research done by the following individuals for a course
in environmental law at the University of Michigan Law School: Roger Connor, Robert
Isaacson, Louis Joseph, Jeff Raney, John Schoonmaker, Edward Thompson, Peter
Thompson and Wayne Witkowski. Roger Conner is a second year law student at Michigan
Law School and is a member of the State Pollution Control Commission.
